Settlement Malpractice
Michael Moffitt†
Lawyers routinely settle lawsuits or advise their clients about settlement. One
might expect, therefore, that clients routinely complain about some aspect of their
lawyers’ settlement services. Ten years of data from eleven jurisdictions paint a
vivid, different picture: although the vast majority of civil lawsuits are resolved
through negotiated settlements and although complaints against lawyers are common, fewer than 1 percent of reported legal malpractice cases and only about 1.5
percent of bar complaints relate in any way to lawyers’ settlement-related conduct or
advice. Even in those instances when clients do raise such complaints, clients rarely
prevail. In short, even though lawyers play a prominent role in settlement, lawyers
currently operate with no meaningful exposure to complaints about this important
aspect of modern practice.
Why do lawyers enjoy this level of de facto immunity? The current legal malpractice system operates on three basic assumptions about lawyering—each of which
contemplates the lawyer’s role in litigation, rather than the lawyer’s role in settlement. First, the law assumes that a lawyer’s strategic judgments should enjoy the
highest level of deference. After all, we would not want to second-guess decisions
about which witnesses to call or which legal theory to advance at trial. Second, the
law assumes that any mistake a lawyer makes will be reflected in dampened
prospects in litigation. This permits us to employ the case-within-a-case method to
determine whether a lawyer’s misconduct caused the client to lose a case they otherwise would have won. And third, the law assumes that clients’ compensable interests
are bounded by the remedial powers of the court. Thus, the appropriate measure of
damages for any instance of litigation malpractice is the difference between what
the court actually did and what a court would have done if the lawyer had been
minimally competent. Each of these assumptions is animated by the limited image
of lawyer-as-litigator, and each might be defensible if the malpractice system dealt
only with alleged litigation errors.
The challenge is that these same three familiar principles shield lawyers from
virtually all accountability in the context of legal negotiations, even though we live
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in the age of settlement. The current system need not—and should not—persist. Negotiated settlements are here to stay. Lawyers will continue to play important roles
in those settlements. Clients should be justified in believing not only that their lawyers are improving at this aspect of their practice, but also that their lawyers are
accountable when they fall short.
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INTRODUCTION
A lawyer who has been working with her client on a high-stakes
piece of litigation for more than a year comes to him1 and says:
Based on all that I now know about your case, I think you
have a very slim chance of winning outright, if this goes to
trial. Opposing counsel just called, and they have offered to
settle at $1 million, along with a confidentiality provision
roughly consistent with your goals. Their offer expires today,
though, and I see no reason to think we’ll do any better, so I
advise you to accept it.
Perhaps the lawyer’s advice is excellent, and she has done a
great job in all aspects of this representation. She made good decisions throughout the litigation, in ways that maximized the client’s prospects of winning a difficult case. She negotiated wisely
and effectively on behalf of her client, maximizing the value the
settlement option will produce for her client. And she has done
her best to communicate clearly with her client about the choice
he now faces.
Or perhaps the lawyer has been substandard in her representation. Her assessment of the client’s litigation prospects is inaccurate. Or her poor litigation decisions up to this point are the
reason the case is now doomed. Or she has so little experience
trying cases that she now has stage fright. Or the proposed settlement terms will not, in fact, provide the confidentiality the client seeks. Or the proposed settlement is structured in a way that
fails to take advantage of tax-minimizing opportunities that
would be obvious to most lawyers. Or the attorney actually received the offer last week but only just now communicated it to
the client. Or the “going rate” for cases like this is much more
attractive than this offer. Or the attorney already told the other
side that this deal would be acceptable to her client.2
Most clients likely believe that their lawyers have provided
outstanding service in such contexts—and most clients are likely
correct in that assessment. Given that most lawsuits settle3 and
1
As a convention for handling gendered pronouns and in order to maintain consistency and clarity, I make general reference in this Article to clients as he/his/him and
attorneys as she/her/hers.
2
Each of these is based on allegations made against lawyers in one or more of the
reported cases I describe in Part I below.
3
Because of methodological differences, no consensus has emerged about the overall
civil settlement rate in the United States. Some have claimed settlement rates approaching 98 percent, but I believe that these assertions take the frequency of jury trials (which
approaches 2 percent in many contexts) and mistakenly assume that the remainder are
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that lawyers play a central role in settlement negotiations and
decision-making, however, we must assume that at least some
lawyers sometimes fall short of the profession’s standards of care
in the settlement context. The lawyer-client relationship is
marked with information asymmetries and potential incentive
misalignments.4 Clients often have a limited ability to assess the
wisdom of their lawyers’ advice because lawyers have specialized
comparative expertise. Clients have few inexpensive ways to
monitor their lawyers’ actions.5 And lawyers are human beings,
prone to “screw up”6 once in a while. In short, it must be the case
that attorneys sometimes fall down in the context of settlement
lawyering, just as they do in all other aspects of lawyering.
Unhappy clients file thousands of complaints against their
former attorneys every year, and given the importance of settlement, one would expect to see complaints about settlement conduct with some frequency. A careful review of reported cases and
of bar complaints, however, paints a very different picture. Complaints against lawyers for substandard settlement advice or behavior are rare. Successful complaints focusing on lawyers’
settlement-related behavior are even rarer. In the ten jurisdictions I studied, there were more than sixteen thousand reported
court opinions stemming from cases involving alleged legal malpractice cases over the past decade. Of those, however, fewer than
1 percent related in any way to allegations of settlement malpractice. Furthermore, only a small fraction of this already small set
of reported cases included a verdict providing some form of recovery for the former client. The landscape is similar with respect to

resolved through settlement. See, for example, Marc Galanter, A World without Trials,
2006 J Disp Resol 7, 12 (estimating only 1.7 percent of civil cases were resolved by trial in
2006). Instead, some of the remaining cases are dismissed on motion or are abandoned,
for example. Still, every credible study of which I am aware has concluded that settlement
is at least the modal means by which most forms of civil litigation are resolved. See, for
example, Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J Empirical Legal Stud 111, 132 (2009) (reporting aggregate settlement rates in the 65–70 percent range); John Barkai and Elizabeth Kent, Let’s Stop
Spreading Rumors about Settlement and Litigation: A Comparative Study of Settlement
and Litigation in Hawaii Courts, 29 Ohio St J Disp Resol 85, 109 (2014) (reporting roughly
similar settlement rates).
4
See, for example, Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm,
16 Yale L & Pol Rev 265, 278 (1998) (describing agency costs in lawyer-client relationships); Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond Winning:
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes 74–76 (Belknap 2000).
5
See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 308 (1976).
6
Herbert M. Kritzer and Neil Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up: Improving Access
to Justice for Legal Malpractice Victims 19–36 (Kansas 2018).
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formal sanctions. Over the last decade, in the jurisdictions I studied, less than 1.5 percent of the almost eight thousand disciplinary actions against lawyers stemmed from the lawyers’ settlement advice or conduct. Even state ethics advisory opinions are
similarly silent about this important aspect of lawyering. In
short, although clients complain about virtually every other aspect of lawyers’ conduct, they rarely complain about lawyers’ roles
in settlement.
This Article explains and casts a critical perspective on that
gap, proceeding in three parts. In Part I, I provide support for two
empirical assertions: that clients rarely complain about settlement malpractice, and that even when clients do complain about
their lawyers’ conduct with respect to settlement, clients rarely
prevail.
In Part II, I argue that the current legal malpractice system
has three basic assumptions built into its structure, each of which
is animated by the limited image of lawyer-as-litigator:
(1) The nature of lawyers’ work demands that they enjoy
sweeping deference when they exercise their professional
judgment during litigation;
(2) The impact of any lawyer errors will be reflected in
changes to trial outcomes; and
(3) Clients’ interests (and, therefore, compensable damages)
are reflected in the pleadings and bounded by the court’s remedial powers.
Each of these three assumptions is perhaps sensible if the malpractice system dealt only with alleged litigation errors. Courts
will reject, for example, assertions that a lawyer should have
called this witness before that witness at trial or should have advanced this theory instead of that theory. Courts will engage in a
case-within-a-case inquiry to establish whether a litigator’s decision proximately caused injury, compensating clients only if the
lawyer’s conduct changed the outcome of the litigation. And no
client will stand to receive compensation for nebulous, speculative, or nonquantifiable injuries stemming from his lawyer’s allegedly inadequate conduct at trial.
The challenge is that these same three familiar—even defensible—principles shield lawyers from virtually all accountability
in the context of settlement, rather than litigation. A malpractice
system that may work in the lawyer-as-litigator context produces
questionable outcomes within the lawyer-as-settlor context.
Whether the legal system is designed intentionally to provide unwarranted protection to lawyers is not the animating question of
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my analysis.7 The current patchwork of rules does, however, serve
to make it astonishingly (some might say indefensibly) difficult
for any client to prevail with complaints about his lawyer’s
settlement-related conduct.
In Part III, I take up the normative question of what a legal
malpractice system would look like if it were harmonized with the
modern reality of lawyer-as-settlor. Specifically, I argue that a
settlement-appropriate conception of lawyers’ roles will require
revisiting at least two, and eventually perhaps three, aspects of
courts’ treatment of settlement malpractice complaints.
First, courts should cast a critical (rather than deferential)
gaze on the settlement counsel lawyers provide. Supporting clients’ autonomy—their ability to make informed choices between
different litigation and settlement paths—demands at least three
separate tasks of lawyers. Competent lawyers must, in this context, understand their clients’ interests, compare the implications
of any proposed settlement against those interests, and articulate
the risks and opportunities associated with continued litigation.
Each of these may appear obvious, and each finds support in existing articulations of professional ethical obligations.8 As a practical matter, however, courts currently tend to group lawyers’ settlement counseling duties together with their litigation duties,
and as a result of the judgmental deference that attaches to
litigation decision-making, clients currently find real challenges

7
Not all are so circumspect in their critiques of the de facto immunity granted to
attorneys under the current laws of certain jurisdictions. See, for example, the full text of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen’s dissent in Muhammad v Strassburger,
McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, in which the majority announced that under
Pennsylvania law, clients are barred from recovering in legal malpractice actions in which
they settled the underlying litigation—even when the settlement was prompted by the
legal malpractice in question:

The majority has just declared a “LAWYER’S HOLIDAY.” . . . It’s Christmastime for Pennsylvania lawyers. If a doctor is negligent in saving a human life,
the doctor pays. If a priest is negligent in saving the spirit of a human, the priest
pays. But if a lawyer is negligent in advising his client as to a settlement, the
client pays. . . . Thus, “filthy lucre” has a higher priority than human life and/or
spirit. The majority calls this “Public Policy.” Maybe . . . Maybe not?? It sure
expedites injustice. Should we change the law so that non-lawyers can be judges?
I dissent.
Muhammad v Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 587 A2d 1346,
1352–53 (Pa 1991) (Larsen dissenting).
8
See, for example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) Rule 1.0(e)
(ABA 2012) (defining “[i]nformed consent”); Rule 1.2 (“Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer”); Rule 1.4 (specifying the required substance
of lawyer-client communications).
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animating the malpractice system as to even these basic settlement-counseling duties.
Second, a settlement-appropriate malpractice system must
recognize that settlements—unlike litigation outcomes—are usually functions of probabilistic rather than binary assessments, are
rarely zero-sum, and are ultimately the product of clients’ choices.
Furthermore, a case’s settlement value is a function of (but is not
identical to) its litigation value. A settlement-appropriate malpractice system would account for each of these differences as it
assesses the proper measure of damages, assigning value to the
full range of lawyers’ impacts on their clients’ interests.
Third, the current system assigns a level of deference to lawyers’ across-the-table negotiation decision-making that may, at
least in some contexts, be unwarranted. The law currently treats
settlement negotiation as entirely indeterminate, with every behavioral variation being chalked up to what Justice Anthony
Kennedy recently referred to as “personal style.”9 If every conceivable settlement decision can be justified ex post as a matter of
style or tactic or context, then lawyers stand effectively immune
from any claim that they have breached the duty of care they owe
to their clients in this arena. If negotiation is truly indeterminate—if literally anything goes—then it is appropriate that all
negotiation should be treated as immune from after-the-fact decision audits. What if it were true that some negotiation decisions
make clients demonstrably worse off? Negotiation research and
education have made enormous advances in recent decades. I argue that the days of treating settlement negotiations as indeterminate and beyond audit are numbered, if not over.
The reforms I describe here are limited, in the sense that they
focus only on the viability of client-driven malpractice actions.
Such complaints represent only one component of any professional
quality assurance mechanism. They would ideally be accompanied
9
Missouri v Frye, 566 US 134, 145 (2012). The Supreme Court has recently taken
up the question of lawyer misconduct in the context of plea bargaining, concluding that
attorneys’ conduct with respect to plea negotiations is sometimes so deficient as to constitute inadequate representation. See, for example, Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156, 160, 174
(2012) (concluding that defendant’s attorney conveyed a favorable plea offer to him but
imprudently convinced him to reject it based on a flawed articulation of the defendant’s
legal risks); Frye, 566 US at 139 (describing that defendant’s attorney failed to convey a
plea offer); Lee v United States, 137 S Ct 1958, 1962, 1969 (2017) (explaining that defendant’s attorney advised accepting a plea agreement based on faulty understanding of the
legal implications of the plea). Recognizing the centrality of plea negotiations to the modern criminal justice system, the Court has unequivocally recognized that lawyers’ settlement behaviors can fall below the constitutionally required level of care owed to defendants. See note 46.
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by improvements in education, practice controls, norms, and market forces. But absent some prospect of accountability in instances when a practitioner falls short of appropriate standards,
none of the rest of these is likely to be sufficient in assuring
profession-wide quality.
The current legal malpractice system makes it harder for clients to bring successful complaints about their lawyers’ settlement conduct than in other lawyering contexts—even though we
live in the “age of settlement.”10 This luxurious position, for which
we have collective responsibility as a self-governed profession,11
should prompt us to talk about the prospect of settlement malpractice openly and honestly. Until settlement malpractice is as
rare, in fact, as current litigation trends suggest it to be, the malpractice system should recognize the centrality of settlement to
modern lawyering, should assess lawyers’ conduct using settlementappropriate standards, and should compensate clients for the full
injuries they suffer when their lawyers’ settlement conduct falls
short.
I. CLAIMS OF SETTLEMENT MALPRACTICE ARE RARE
Lawyers often create value for their clients in the context of
settlement. Yet lawyers are human, and it stands to reason that
at least some lawyers sometimes fall short in delivering on this
promise. Given the volume of settlement activity, one would expect, therefore, to see complaints against lawyers alleging settlement malpractice12 with some frequency in civil claims of legal

10 Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 Ind L J 727, 771 (2005)
(coining the phrase “age of settlement” with respect to the current era of civil litigation).
11 The legal profession is not, of course, fully self-governing. See, for example, Fred
C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 Minn L Rev 1147, 1153 (2009) (arguing that
descriptions of the legal profession as self-regulating are descriptively inaccurate and normatively problematic). Nevertheless, the narrative and values associated with selfgovernance are well entrenched. See, for example, Model Rules, Preamble ¶ 10 (“The legal
profession is largely self-governing.”).
12 Lawsuits against attorneys generally sound in tort, contract, or a combination of
these two, depending on the jurisdiction. The fundamental components of any claim do not
vary meaningfully across these jurisdictions, however. In this Article, I refer to “malpractice,” which suggests an action in tort, but the same analyses would be true in jurisdictions
in which courts regard these actions as contract actions. See Merri A. Baldwin, Scott F.
Bertschi, and Dylan C. Black, eds, The Law of Lawyers’ Liability ix (ABA 2012) (“While
different states impose varying requirements, the basic elements of a legal malpractice
claim are essentially the same across the country. A legal malpractice claim can sound in
contract or tort or both—except in Alabama, where the only available cause of action is a
statutory one.”). States differ in whether they allow tort or contract legal malpractice
claims. See, for example, Johnson v Carleton, 765 A2d 571, 573 n 3 (Me 2001) (“tort rather
than in contract”); United States National Bank of Oregon v Davies, 548 P2d 966, 968 (Or
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malpractice, bar disciplinary reports scolding attorneys for their
settlement conduct, or ethics advisory opinions clarifying lawyers’
duties related to settlement. In fact, as an empirical matter, we
see none of these three.
A.

Reported Malpractice Cases

There are currently approximately 1.3 million licensed attorneys in the United States, and the domestic legal services industry comprises more than a quarter of a trillion dollars in revenue
annually.13 Each year, there are about eight thousand claims or
complaints by clients who were unhappy about some aspect of
their lawyers’ services.14 And we know that it is common for lawyers to negotiate and to counsel their clients about settlement.
The empirical question, then, becomes whether claims
against lawyers reflect how prominent settlement is in lawyers’
practices. The short answer is no. Less than 1 percent of all reported cases about legal malpractice over the last decade stemmed
from claims against lawyers for settlement malpractice.15
Working with available online databases, I reviewed thousands of reported cases involving alleged legal malpractice.
Where possible, I automated aspects of the search, but for reasons
I describe below and in the Appendix, much of this work demanded individual case reviews in order to discern whether a
case stemmed from an allegation of settlement malpractice or
from something else. I read16 more than one thousand cases as
part of the process of reviewing and coding the dataset.

1976) (“We have construed such actions to be ones of tort rather than of contract.”); Jackson
State Bank v King, 844 P2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo 1993) (“contractual in nature”); Shipman v
Kruck, 593 SE2d 319, 322 (Va 2004) (“[A]lthough legal malpractice actions sound in tort,
it is the contract that gives rise to the duty.”).
13 See Kritzer and Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up at 3 (cited in note 6) (providing
data on legal services market size); New ABA Data Reveals Rise in Number of US Lawyers,
15 Percent Increase Since 2008 (ABA, May 11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/DH7Y
-AY9A (describing data on the number of licensed, active attorneys in the United States).
14 Whether eight thousand is a high number, a low number, or just the right number
is not my question for this Article. The point, instead, is that one would expect to see some
relationship between the frequency with which lawyers undertake an activity and the frequency with which clients complain about that activity. See also Kritzer and Vidmar,
When Lawyers Screw Up at 65–72 (cited in note 6) (estimating the frequency of malpractice claims as ranging between 7.5 and 9.7 per 1,000 lawyers, based on data from two
national insurance carriers).
15 See Table 1.
16 Perhaps more honestly, with respect to at least some of these cases, “skimmed.”
As I noted in the author’s footnote, I had the benefit of a team of talented research assistants who helped me with many aspects of the empirical work reflected in this Section.
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The decision to use reported cases as the overarching dataset
for this portion of my research comes with some virtues and some
limitations. Using reported cases has the benefit that the data are
easy to access, enjoy a high degree of uniformity across jurisdictions, and are familiar to scholarly legal researchers. Furthermore, because published opinions are the most accessible and
common form of information about the treatment of legal questions, they provide the backbone for any public information or deterrent effect. The use of reported17 court opinions for this aspect
of the research, however, presents several limitations. For example, it does not capture complaints by unhappy clients whose
cases terminated in legally unremarkable, and, perhaps, unpublishable ways. Particularly with low dollar claims that are unlikely to present attractive appellate conditions, the simple legal
malpractice claim that dies on an initial dispositive motion, or
even on summary judgment, is unlikely to appear as a published
court opinion. Similarly, these data would not capture incidents
in which clients were unhappy but were unaware that there was
even the prospect of recovery against their attorney or that their
attorney’s conduct was in some way responsible for the unwanted
outcome. These data would not reflect cases in which injured parties were unable to secure legal representation and, therefore,
abandoned their claims.18 And of course, data based on court opinions will often fail to capture instances in which the parties to a
legal malpractice suit resolve the suit through settlement.19
Although I reviewed many cases and coded them independently as a double check, I also
relied heavily on the judgment of my research assistants with respect to these reviews.
17 I observed no difference between the frequency with which settlement malpractice
cases appear in published versus unpublished opinions.
18 Plaintiffs may, as an empirical matter, have a harder than usual time finding attorneys willing to sue other attorneys. See Kritzer and Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up
at 144 (cited in note 6) (citing an “absence of a substantial number of plaintiff-side practitioners handling [legal malpractice] cases”).
19 I am aware of no data specifically tracking the rate at which legal malpractice
cases settle. One study of insurance data indicates that between 56–80 percent of insurance claims involving legal malpractice are resolved without a lawsuit even being filed,
suggesting that the percentage of claims that go all the way through trial would be quite
low. See id at 28–29. Data from the Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Professional Liability suggest that roughly one quarter of claims against lawyers ripen into lawsuits, and
that only about 3 percent of legal malpractice suits then proceed to judgment following
trial. Id at 95–96, 125–26. Ronald Mallen reports a trend toward a greater percentage of
legal malpractice claims being resolved through settlement, but his data relies principally
on studies from 1986 and 1996. See Ronald E. Mallen, 1 Legal Malpractice § 1:18 at 46
(Thomson Reuters 2017) (“[T]here was a significant increase of approximately 8.5 percent
in the number of files closed with a settlement payment being made after the commencement of litigation by the claimant.”). Furthermore, common sense and my anecdotal interviews with law firm partners suggest that, at least in corporate counsel settings, firms will
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Pre-suit or early settlement is a routine aspect of modern, complex legal malpractice litigation. Reported cases, therefore, capture only a part of the picture. But I can intuit no reason why
legal malpractice claims alleging settlement malpractice should
resolve earlier or more quietly than other forms of alleged legal
malpractice. This may be a limited snapshot, but because it is
comparative as against all other forms of alleged malpractice,
these data paint an interesting picture.
The combination of these limiting factors means that this
search of reported legal malpractice (1) almost certainly understates the frequency of clients’ unhappiness about their lawyers’
settlement-related conduct, and (2) probably overstates the frequency with which clients’ claims are legally meritorious.20 However, no publicly available, searchable databases of complaints
yet exist in a form that would permit research without some or all
of the limitations above. It made sense, therefore, to at least include this dataset in the effort to understand the current settlement malpractice landscape.
I recorded as “Settlement Malpractice Cases” only those cases
that included an allegation of some lawyer misconduct related to
settlement.21 The “Hits” figure represents the number of cases
that emerged initially from an automated search, many of which
ultimately proved to be false positives. Table 1 below summarizes
those findings.

commonly adjust bills in the face of unhappy clients—a result that would produce no public paper trail.
20 If a client has a conspicuously untenable claim against an attorney, one would
expect it to be dismissed early in the life of the litigation and that such a dismissal would
be unlikely to merit publication. The dataset of reported cases, therefore, probably includes
atypically strong bases for complaints (even if many of them are ultimately unsuccessful).
21 In many cases, plaintiffs alleged that the attorneys engaged in multiple acts constituting malpractice. For example, an attorney might be accused of having an undisclosed
conflict of interest, of having botched some aspect of the litigation, and of having urged an
unwise settlement. In order to be conservative, if any of the alleged conduct involved settlement, the case was counted as involving settlement malpractice.

1836

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:1825

TABLE 1: REPORTED LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES 2008–2017
State

Total Reported Legal
Malpractice
Cases

“Hits”
Using
Search
Terms

Settlement
Malpractice Cases

Percentage
of Legal
Malpractice
Cases

AL
AR
CT
DE
IA
ME
MD
MI
OH
TN
WI
Total

1,144
698
1,923
1,048
854
398
1,213
2,306
4,275
1,443
1,439
16,741

75
33
154
98
37
26
62
157
414
88
66
1,210

5
1
20
8
0
4
8
43
28
8
0
125

0.44%
0.14%
1.04%
0.76%
0.00%
1.01%
0.66%
1.86%
0.65%
0.55%
0.00%
0.75%

For each of the 125 reported opinions in which the underlying
claim was actually about settlement malpractice, I also coded the
case according to types of claim, and to the extent discernable,
according to which party ultimately prevailed. Those results appear in Table 2.
TABLE 2: RESOLUTION OF REPORTED SETTLEMENT MALPRACTICE CASES
2008–2017
Resolution
Verdict for Defendant Attorney
Probable Settlement
Clear Settlement
Verdict for Plaintiff Client
Unknown

Number

Percentage

84
3
4
9
25

67.2%
2.4%
3.2%
7.2%
20.0%

These results are directionally consistent with other available data. I am aware of only two empirical studies that have
coded specifically for negotiation and settlement behavior in legal
malpractice actions. Professors Herbert Kritzer and Neil Vidmar
reported that in the Missouri data they reviewed, spanning the
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years 2005–2014, just under 10 percent of the complaints against
lawyers involved “[s]ettlement or negotiation,” and 22 percent of
those complaints were ultimately successful.22 The description of
the coding associated with these statistics suggests that “settlement or negotiation” would include a wide range of conduct unrelated to settling lawsuits. For example, an allegation that an attorney failed appropriately to negotiate the terms of a commercial
lease would presumably be included on their list, as it involves
“negotiation.” Furthermore, their data included complaints that
had not yet ripened into lawsuits.23 Similar methodology appears
in the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on
Lawyers’ Professional Liability report, which indicates that 5.8
percent of claims against lawyers resulted from lawyers’ conduct
in the course of “Settlement/Negotiation,” without differentiating
the two activities.24 As a result, the final numbers in these studies
include far more complaints than I included in the research for
this Article. Nevertheless, even though the datasets and underlying methodologies are quite different from the one I employ in this
Article, their conclusions are directionally similar: lawsuits (and
particularly successful lawsuits) against lawyers for settlement
malpractice are extremely rare.
B.

Disciplinary Cases

In an effort to understand the fuller landscape of client satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with lawyers’ settlement conduct, I
also examined formal ethics complaints filed against attorneys.
Such disciplinary controls form one of the foundational mechanisms by which the profession seeks to assure the quality of the
services its members provide.25 Like malpractice actions, ethics
complaints arise only ex post and only when dissatisfied clients
take the initiative to bring a complaint. They likely understate
considerably, therefore, the instances of lawyer misconduct for all

22 Kritzer and Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up at 84, 104 (cited in note 6). In their
study, Professors Kritzer and Vidmar treated as “successful” any circumstances in which
the claimant obtained some payment. This is a different standard than whether the claimant ultimately prevailed at trial. Id at 100.
23 Id at 30–31.
24 Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Profile of Legal Malpractice Claims: 2012–2015 15 (ABA 2016). No data were published to permit an assessment
of the disposition of just settlement-related conduct.
25 See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv L Rev 799, 805–
09 (1992) (suggesting four basic modes of regulating lawyers: disciplinary controls, liability controls, institutional controls, and legislative controls).
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of the same reasons as civil malpractice actions. Furthermore, because ethics complaints rarely provide the prospect of significant
monetary recovery for clients, one might imagine that there
would be even fewer such complaints, compared with civil lawsuits. Still, enough differences exist—in procedural protections,
in barriers to bringing complaints, in decision-makers, in timelines, and in reporting—that ethics complaints form a potentially
interesting and distinct dataset for understanding the landscape
of settlement misconduct.
One significant feature of any state bar’s collection of disciplinary opinions is that opinions (as opposed to the underlying
complaints) almost uniformly reflect only instances in which the
relevant disciplinary review board has judged that the attorney’s
conduct failed to meet some aspect of the relevant ethical standards. Looking at disciplinary opinions alone, therefore, it would
not be possible to determine anything about the frequency with
which clients’ complaints are successful.26 One hundred percent
of published disciplinary reports reflect a successful complaint—
rather than serving as evidence that all complaints are judged
meritorious.27 Many states also provide aggregated data that include the total number of complaints filed, and from that, one
could determine an aggregated “success” rate across all complaints.28 But even more so than with malpractice actions, there
is no reliable way to assess the likelihood that a client’s ethicsbased complaint will be successful in contexts in which the alleged misconduct relates specifically to settlement behavior.
The data I reviewed included many instances of attorneys
having been accused of multiple kinds of misconduct. For example, in In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Lamb,29 the complaint included at least seventy-five different counts of misconduct against a single attorney. These counts included improperly
establishing a client trust account, not returning phone calls, and
26 For more on the problematic lack of transparency attached to ethical complaints
against lawyers, see generally Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1 (2007).
27 See id at 17–21 (describing the disciplinary complaint process).
28 See, for example, State Bar of Arizona, Annual Report of the Attorney Regulation
Advisory Committee to the Arizona Supreme Court (Apr 26, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z78A-HW4D; The Board of Disciplinary Appeals Appointed by the Supreme
Court of Texas, Report 2018, archived at http://perma.cc/BZD5-TA32; Oregon State Bar, Disciplinary Board Reporter (2017), archived at http://perma.cc/C6P6-CFRC; The State Bar of
California, Annual Discipline Report for Year Ending December 31, 2018 (Apr 30, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/KTF5-58Z3; New York State Bar Association, 2017 Annual Report,
archived at http://perma.cc/B94W-BGFQ.
29 864 NW2d 794 (Wis 2015).
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failure to take action on pending litigation. However, included in
what the board called a “pervasive pattern of misconduct”30 were
allegations that Lamb had told his client “that the defendants had
made a settlement offer” which the client instructed Lamb to accept.31 For years thereafter, Lamb informed his client that the settlement was “close to being finalized,”32 but in fact had forged his
client’s signature on the back of the settlement check and deposited the money for himself.33 For purposes of this study, in order
to be conservative with the estimates, if any of the allegations
against the attorney involved settlement conduct, it was treated
as though it were a settlement misconduct case. Table 3 below
summarizes the findings.
TABLE 3: PUBLISHED BAR DISCIPLINARY CASES 2008–2017
State

Total
Published
Disciplinary
Cases

“Hits”
Using
Search
Terms

Settlement
Malpractice
Cases

Percentage of
Disciplinary
Cases

AR
IN
IA
ME
MA
MI
OR
TN
TX
WV
Total

400
1,052
822
211
1,622
1,044
422
1,366
662
310
7,911

256
22
326
154
775
227
417
148
321
125
2,771

6
2
14
4
11
14
58
2
2
4
117

1.50%
0.19%
1.70%
1.90%
0.68%
1.34%
13.74%
0.15%
0.30%
1.29%
1.48%

As with tort-based malpractice claims, clients are unlikely ultimately to prevail with their complaints against attorneys. The
chart above suggests that over a ten-year period almost eight thousand complaints against lawyers were successful and resulted in

30

Id at 795.
Id at 798.
32 Id.
33 Disciplinary Proceedings against Lamb, 864 NW2d at 803. The court ultimately
found against Lamb, revoked his license, and ordered him to pay restitution. Id at 805–06.
31
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published discipline. But there were more than eighty-five thousand bar complaints filed nationwide in 2016 alone.34 This suggests
a “success” rate below 5 percent. Therefore, this review of disciplinary actions yields a conclusion similar to that of the review of
malpractice actions: allegations of settlement malpractice constitute only a tiny percentage of disciplinary actions, and clients
rarely succeed even when they do file complaints.
C.

Ethics Advisory Opinions

Finally, I examined formal state bar ethics advisory opinions,
looking to see if settlement malpractice appears in the statements
aimed at clarifying the appropriate application of state legal ethics rules.35 Such opinions would not be direct evidence of claims
against attorneys by former clients. They might, however, be evidence suggesting some ambiguity in the articulation of ethical
constraints or in their application to particular fact patterns. And
because such opinions are generally the product of inquiries by
practicing attorneys to the relevant body within the state bar,
their existence or absence might at least give an indication of the
extent to which lawyers fear such complaints.
Because state ethics rules change infrequently, this search involved an expanded timeframe. Whenever possible, I searched every
published ethics advisory opinion available since the adoption of
each state’s most recent ethics rules or codes. In many cases, this
meant that the database extended back several decades. I focused
on six geographically and demographically diverse states, with an
eye toward including representation both of Model Rule and Model
Code jurisdictions.36 In addition to the Boolean search terms used
with the other two datasets, I added search terms aimed at unearthing opinions about the ethics provisions that I judged most likely to
be relevant to settlement malpractice complaints.37 The results of
this search and review process appear in Table 4.

34 Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, 2016 Survey on Lawyer Discipline
Systems (S.O.L.D.) *3 (ABA, Jan 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7RDG-NPJF (describing 87,487 complaints received by disciplinary agencies and only 3,017 attorneys charged
after probable cause determinations—about 3.4 percent of bar complaints).
35 For general information on ethics opinions, see Legal Ethics Research Guide: Ethics
Opinions (Georgetown Law Library, Oct 16, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/VN8L-X4C9.
36 For a discussion of the ABA’s decision to adopt the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a replacement for the Model Code of Professional Conduct, see generally Robert J.
Kutak, Postscript: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 Cap U L Rev 585 (1982).
37 For example, in Model Rule states, I also searched for and reviewed all opinions
about Rules 1.0(e) (“Informed consent”), 1.2(a) (allocation of authority), 1.4(a)(1), and
1.4(b) (communication with client).
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TABLE 4: PUBLISHED ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS 2008–2017
State

Years

Total
Published
Advisory
Opinions

“Hits”
Using
Search
Terms

Opinions
Involving
Settlement
Malpractice

Percentage of
Total
Opinions

NY

2008–
2017
2008–
2017
2008–
2017
1981–
2017
1966–
2017
1979–
2017

322

158

4

1.24%

22

14

3

13.64%

63

40

0

0.00%

145

0

0

0.00%

937

8

0

0.00%

79

10

0

0.00%

1,568

230

7

0.45%

CA
IL
AL
IA
DE
Total

Although not identical to the percentage of published court
opinions or published disciplinary opinions, it is clear that the
data on ethics advisory opinions are not directionally different
from those appearing elsewhere in this Part.
A number of factors may contribute to the scarcity of
settlement-related complaints. Perhaps clients are unaware that
they were injured in any way.38 (“The case settled. I’m happy
enough, I guess. You never get everything you want.”) Perhaps
clients are unaware that their injuries were the result of their
lawyers’ conduct. (“The case didn’t settle because the other side
38 This possibility supports the description of lawyering as a “credence good.” See, for
example, Gillian K. Hadfield and Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to
Promote Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 Hastings L J 1191, 1196
(2016) (describing lawyering as a “credence good” because consumers of legal services
struggle to “judge the quality of the services provided”); Nathaniel G. Hilger, Why Don’t
People Trust Experts?, 59 J L & Econ 293, 306–08 (2016) (explaining the dynamics of markets for credence goods, including legal services). See also John C.P. Goldberg, What Are
We Reforming? Tort Theory’s Place in Debates over Malpractice Reform, 59 Vand L Rev
1075, 1078 (2006) (discussing how plaintiffs may refrain from bringing medical malpractice suits due to information asymmetries); Kritzer and Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up
at 12 (cited in note 6) (describing the “[r]ecognition and [a]ttribution [p]roblem” for plaintiffs bringing professional malpractice suits).
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was being unreasonable. What can you do?”) Perhaps cognitive
dissonance dissuades clients from viewing their lawyers’ conduct
critically.39 (“I make smart choices. I both chose this lawyer and
made the final decision about whether to settle. I believe in my
choices, and in all events, I made the choices.”) Perhaps clients
perceive little prospect of recovery even if they do complain.
(“What lawyer is going to help me sue another lawyer?40 What
judge is going to rule in favor of a client over a lawyer? And even
if I really show some error, am I really going to recover anything?”) Perhaps lawyers are just atypically excellent at all aspects of the settlement process—even though we see lawyers
make mistakes in all other aspects of their work, maybe there is
just nothing to complain about with respect to their settlement
conduct.41
But one would expect that at least sometimes, clients would
perceive their lawyers to have engaged in substandard behavior
that caused the client some form of injury. To the extent civil lawsuits alleging settlement malpractice are rare even in those contexts,42 and to the extent such suits are unlikely to be successful,
one justification might be that although the relevant tort and contract laws do not functionally permit civil liability, the profession’s internal ethical and regulatory mechanisms address any
risk of this form of malpractice. To the extent that there are not
disciplinary actions against attorneys for violations of their
settlement-related duties,43 one explanation might be that the
rules are too ambiguous to support complaints reliably. But if it
were a question of ambiguity, then one might expect to see a
greater number of ethics advisory opinions.44 Instead, the data
show that neither complaints nor inquiries are common, suggesting that settlement malpractice is largely not contemplated
within the existing legal frameworks.
The scarcity of settlement-related complaints, combined with
their futility, paints a potentially troubling picture. If settlement

39 See, for example, Jennifer K. Robbennolt and Jean R. Sternlight, Psychology for
Lawyers 21–24 (ABA 2012) (describing cognitive dissonance and its frequent coupling with
confirmation biases).
40 See Kritzer and Vidmar, When Lawyers Screw Up at 144 (cited in note 6).
41 Of all of the possible explanations I offer in this paragraph, this final one is the
only one I am comfortable rejecting outright. Nothing in my experience as a law professor,
as a mediator, or as a consultant in negotiations supports the picture of lawyers as infallible negotiators.
42 See Part I.A.
43 See Part I.B.
44 See Part I.C.
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is an important part of modern lawyering, one should expect lawyers to be accountable in those instances when their conduct falls
below reasonable professional standards. Given the prominence
of settlement to the modern litigation landscape, one should expect the legal system to have developed mechanisms for effectively assessing lawyers’ settlement services for their clients. A
critical examination of the current professional liability landscape suggests this is not the case.
II. THE (INADEQUATE) LAWYER-AS-LITIGATOR LENS ON
SETTLEMENT MALPRACTICE
The current legal malpractice system relies on a set of at least
three implicit assumptions about lawyers, their roles, and the impacts of their decisions. Each of those assumptions is important
and even legitimate—if lawyers are acting as litigators.45 First,
the current system assumes that lawyers’ judgments should generally be treated with sweeping judgmental deference approaching immunity. Second, the current system assumes that lawyers’
actions will directly—even exclusively—affect their clients’ prospects in court. A good lawyer will improve the client’s litigation
expectations, and any misconduct will be reflected in a diminished litigation expectation. And third, the current system assumes that the proper measure of any damages deriving from
malpractice will be properly captured by comparing the actual litigation outcome with the litigation outcome that would have resulted in a world in which the attorney had acted differently.
Each of these three assumptions may be valid and important in a
litigation context. But I argue in this Part that each of these assumptions presents serious shortcomings in a world in which settlement is prominent.
A.

Breaches of Duty and Judgmental Deference

It is axiomatic that lawyers owe their clients “ordinary
care.”46 The litigation context provides a relatively bifurcated cat-

45 The line between lawyer-as-litigator and lawyer-as-settlor is not a bright one, of
course. Settlement counseling and settlement negotiations take place “in the shadow of
the law,” with expected litigation outcomes being among the principal drivers of the relevant legal endowments and constraints. Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950, 968 (1979).
46 See Ronald E. Mallen, 2 Legal Malpractice § 20:2 at 1321 (Thomson Reuters 2017)
(“[A]n attorney should exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by attorneys
under similar circumstances.”) (emphasis in original). In the context of plea bargaining,
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egorization of attorney actions. Certain attorney actions are easily measured against a bright-line (low) bar. Missing a statute of
limitations, failing to call an expert witness when expert testimony is required, or failing to serve the proper parties will result
in a clear finding that the attorney breached her duty of care to
her client.47 As to almost everything else, however, courts have
treated attorneys’ litigation-related decision-making with a level
of judgmental deference that effectively means that the attorney’s
decisions are beyond review.48 Litigation is interactively strategic,
with each side reacting to the other’s decisions in iterated ways.
This dynamic produces a complex system that would be difficult,
if not impossible, to unpack reliably from both a duty and a causation perspective. Given this complexity, and because the relevant inquiry is not “was this the best move the attorney could
have made,” but rather, “was this an actionably bad move the attorney made,” this level of deference attaches to almost all litigation decisions.
In addressing allegations of settlement malpractice, courts
have essentially imported this set of judgmental immunity rules
from litigation. The settlement context presents few, if any, bright
line rules akin to statutes of limitations. Instead, if anything, the
negotiation process is even more strategically interactive than the
litigation context. Whether I make this offer or that offer, respond
in this way or that way, agree or disagree with this procedural or
substantive request, depends in large measure on my assessment
recent Supreme Court opinions also make clear that there is a constitutional aspect to
lawyers’ duties to their clients—what Professor Rishi Batra called “a negotiation competency bar for criminal defense attorneys.” Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 309, 310 (2013). I would imagine that this standard is lower than the bar of “ordinary care.” That is, I presume that
attorneys as a group do not “ordinarily” fall below the constitutionally mandated minimum
effectiveness. See Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence beyond
Lafler and Frye, 53 Am Crim L Rev 377, 399–406 (2016) (arguing for competence standards in plea bargaining beyond the context of client counseling).
47 Because “ordinary care” is context specific, no exhaustive list of per se breaches of
such care exists. Examples from the litigation context include such things as “procedural
missteps that foreclosed opportunities to take advantage of legal remedies, such as failure
to serve process, negligent conduct of a trial, failure to attend the trial, or failure to call
crucial witnesses.” Zalta v Billips, 81 Cal App 3d 183, 188 (1978). Whether particular conduct constitutes a breach of “ordinary care” is generally a matter in which the factfinder
must rely on expert testimony. See, for example, First National Bank of LaGrange v Lowrey,
872 NE2d 447, 464 (Ill App 2007).
48 See Mallen, 2 Legal Malpractice § 19:1 at 1232 (cited in note 46). See also id § 33:85
at 924 (discussing how lawyers’ judgment in settlement decisions is generally given deferential treatment); State v Madison, 770 P2d 662, 667 (Wash App 1989) (“The decision of
when or whether to object is a classic example of trial tactics. Only in egregious circumstances . . . will the failure to object constitute incompetence of counsel.”).
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of what you are thinking. And meanwhile, you are engaged in the
same process of trying to assess me, my reactions, and my decisions. With this image of the challenge of unpacking settlement
negotiation decisions, it is not surprising that courts have landed
in a place of sweeping deference.
Amplifying this default level of judgmental deference, a lawyer enjoys at least three avenues to defend against an allegation
that she breached her duty of ordinary care. First, she may argue
that her conduct was common among her peers—that it was, in
fact “ordinary.”49 “Everyone is doing it” may not be persuasive as
a theory of criminal defense or as an entreaty from a teenager to
his parents, but in the context of professional malpractice, the argument can be dispositive because the burden for a complaining
party is to establish that his lawyer’s conduct fell outside of normal practice. How can the client demonstrate that this behavior
deviates from what other lawyers would have done in that situation?50 These burdens are insurmountable for many complaining
parties. Second, a defending attorney may argue that her conduct
represented a strategic or tactical decision based on her own experience of what works best for her. “This may not be how everyone else does it, but it’s how I do it, and I know myself and what
works for me.” Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Missouri v Frye51
that negotiations are a matter of “personal style”52 has intuitive
appeal53 and some empirical support.54 What works for one person

49

See Mallen, 2 Legal Malpractice § 20:2 at 1320 (cited in note 46).
The confidentiality attached to most legal negotiations creates a challenge even
for expert testimony to reliably establish practice norms with respect to specific negotiation conduct.
51 566 US 134 (2012).
52 Id at 145.
53 I have been teaching law students and consulting with practicing attorneys, executives, and diplomats in executive training programs for more than two decades. I commonly hear them say things like, “I could never negotiate the way my [former boss/best
friend/uncle/mentor] negotiates, even though she/he seems to have success with it.”
54 For example, Professors Deborah Kolb and Linda Putnam describe a “double bind”
for women in negotiation because some of the behaviors traditionally associated with negotiation success “when enacted by a woman are likely to be seen differently than they are
when men employ them.” Deborah M. Kolb and Linda L. Putnam, Negotiation through a
Gender Lens, in Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone, eds, The Handbook of Dispute
Resolution 137–38 (Jossey-Bass 2005). Similarly, one’s contextual “social positioning” may
have a serious effect on how one’s negotiation actions are received. See Carol Watson,
Gender versus Power as a Predictor of Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes, 10 Negot J
117, 120 (1994) (explaining that “situational power” may influence how men and women
behave in negotiating contexts). See also generally Hannah Riley and Kathleen L.
McGinn, When Does Gender Matter in Negotiation? (HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Sept 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/LZ45-QPMT (analyzing the material
effects of gender in negotiations).
50
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in negotiation may not work as well for another. According to this
line of argumentation, what may appear to be a breach of a duty
might in fact be a highly responsible, adapted, learned set of behaviors that the defending attorney believed to be more effective.55 Third, a defending attorney may point to the uncertainties
associated with negotiation and may argue that her decisions
were justified from a risk-reward perspective, even if they did not
produce the desired results in this particular case. “The actions I
took may have been risky, but the potential payoff justified the
risk and should not be second-guessed.”56 Under this logic, we
should assign judgmental immunity to a broad range of decisions,
so long as they are potentially justifiable under some theory of
risk and reward, and there is considerable support for this in the
current legal landscape.57
Furthermore, because the line between the roles of client and
attorney blur in negotiation—in a way that is different from litigation—lawyers often enjoy additional shields from accountability. Consider, for example, the question of what settlement figure
to propose to the other side. One can easily imagine that a client
might want his attorney to make the strategic decision about
when and what to offer, thinking that the attorney’s experience
and training and distance from the case better positions her to
make that kind of judgment. But one can also imagine a client
having a strongly held view about the wisdom of one negotiation
approach over another. What then? In the case underlying Ram v
Cooper,58 the plaintiffs’ daughters were injured in an automobile
accident.59 Unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, their attorney sent a
demand letter to the relevant insurance carrier. When the plaintiffs

55 One might further argue that, as a policy matter, failing to defer to this kind of
individual choice might risk calcifying a particular set of existing practices, precluding the
eventual development of even more effective practices across the field.
56 Both as to parallels to the ethics of negotiation and as to the risk-reward calculations and associated information asymmetries, many have suggested a connection between poker and negotiation. See, for example, How to Play Your Hand: Lessons for Negotiators from Poker, 2 UNLV Gaming L J 231, 234, 248 (2011); Russell Korobkin, Michael
Moffitt, and Nancy Welsh, The Law of Bargaining, 87 Marq L Rev 839, 839 (2004). See
also generally Steven Lubet, Lawyers’ Poker: 52 Lessons that Lawyers Can Learn from
Card Players (Oxford 2006).
57 For example, “judgmental immunity” is often applied in roughly the same manner
in the execution of settlement agreements as with tactical litigation decisions. See, for
example, Meyer v Wagner, 709 NE2d 784, 786, 791 (Mass 1999) (no malpractice liability
for pursuing reasonable strategies in executing a settlement agreement that ultimately
failed).
58 2002 WL 31772008 (Cal App).
59 Id at *1.
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learned of the offer and of the insurance company’s “very discouraging” response, they sought to engage actively in the substance
and strategy of the settlement negotiations. Pointing to a practice
guide they had consulted regarding typical settlement values and
anecdotal evidence of similar claims, the plaintiffs asked their attorney to make an offer five times the daughters’ combined medical expenses—a figure much higher than the figure under discussion between their attorney and the insurer.60 The attorney
treated this instruction from his clients as a constructive discharge and withdrew from the representation. The plaintiffs
eventually settled with the insurer and filed a legal malpractice
action against their former attorney.61 The court found for the attorney, noting that the attorney was not bound to convey an offer
he did not believe to be wise.62
In professional activities involving bright-line, scientific
rules, there may be unarguably obvious errors. The filing deadline was missed, the architect files a certificate of work that was
not actually completed, or the patient’s test results were never
appropriately forwarded to a specialist. Many aspects of negotiation, however, have been characterized (accurately) as having at
least some aspects that are more like “art” than “science.”63 Negotiation involves iterated decisions with uncertain information, a
human client, and a human counterpart, and that combination
produces decision points that lend themselves poorly to formulas
or bright lines. Whether to make an early offer or wait for the
other side to act, for example, may be the subject of strongly held
opinions among different practitioners. But no consensus exists
among negotiation professionals about a universal prescription
regarding whether to be the first to act.64

60

Id at *2–3.
Id at *3–4.
62 Ram, 2002 WL 31772008 at *13, citing California Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3-700(C)(1)(e). Taken to its extreme, this logic must have limits. We would surely
perceive a role for the client in choosing between Litigation Strategy A (giving her an 80
percent chance of winning $1 million—an $800,000 expected litigation value) and Litigation Strategy B (giving her a 10 percent chance of winning $8 million—also an $800,000
expected litigation value). Still, courts have routinely deferred to lawyers’ roles in negotiation when their judgment clashed with that of their clients.
63 See generally Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Belknap 1982).
64 For a survey of some of the conflicting literature in this regard, see Robbennolt
and Sternlight, Psychology for Lawyers 273–74 (cited in note 39).
61
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Reflective of the art aspect of negotiation, some have analogized negotiation to jazz.65 Jazz, like negotiation, relies on some
measure of intuition and improvisation,66 paired with experience
and practice. Still, it is not the case that there is no such thing as
a wrong note or missed timing when one endeavors to play jazz.
Some things are honking bad. But as long as the music is at least
recognizable as jazz (even if, perhaps, a middle school jazz band
version of jazz), its improvisational decisions and implementation
will enjoy a heightened level of deference. It is still jazz. Continuing with the analogy, even if there may not be “one right way” to
negotiate, it does not follow that there are “no wrong ways” to negotiate. But because of the improvisation and intuition involved,
clients face enormous challenges in establishing that some aspect of
a lawyer’s settlement negotiation conduct fell below ordinary care.
B.

Proximate Causation and Settlement

Even if an unhappy client establishes that an attorney’s settlement conduct fell below the applicable standard of care, he will
only be able to recover if he can also demonstrate that the breach
was a substantial factor in causing injury to the client.67 The accepted approach for establishing such causation in a litigation
malpractice context is the case-within-a-case method. That turnback-the-clock68 exercise requires an inquiry by a new factfinder,
often in a new venue, into what “would have” or “should have”
happened in the underlying litigation if the attorney had behaved
differently.69 In this inquiry, we hold the rest of the litigation universe constant, testing the effects of a single, new variable—an
improved, now minimally competent, level of representation by
the client’s attorney. If minimally competent lawyering would
have changed the substantive outcome of the litigation, we deem
the proximate causation question to have been answered.
65 I thank Professor Scott Peppet for suggesting this analogy in this context. For a
detailed look at the analogy between jazz and settlement mediation, see generally John
W. Cooley, Mediation, Improvisation, and All That Jazz, 2007 J Disp Resol 325.
66 See Michael Wheeler, The Art of Negotiation: How to Improvise Agreement in a
Chaotic World 97–117 (Simon & Schuster 2013). See also generally Jeffrey Krivis, Improvisational Negotiation: A Mediator’s Stories about Love, Money, and Anger—and the Strategies That Resolved Them (Jossey-Bass 2006).
67 Mallen, 1 Legal Malpractice § 8:20 at 1037–41 (cited in note 19) (discussing the
“substantial factor” test for establishing causation in legal malpractice claims).
68 Robert E. Mallen, 4 Legal Malpractice § 37:1 at 1446 (Thomson Reuters 2017). See
also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 (2000) (explaining causation
and damages for lawyer civil liability).
69 “Would have” and “should have” are typically treated as the same question in this
context. See Mallen, 4 Legal Malpractice § 37:87 at 1700–01 (cited in note 68).
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In a settlement context, however, there is almost always at
least one decision made by someone other than the defending attorney that complicates the question of causation. Three different
kinds of actors may make decisions following those of the attorney,
and any one of those decisions might complicate or break the causation chain in ways that create sweeping immunity for lawyers.
First, and perhaps most commonly, the intervening decisionmaker might be the client himself. Because the final decision
whether to settle belongs to the client,70 if a client’s lawyer consents to a settlement, the law generally assumes that the client
must have approved it.71 If the other side extended an offer and
there was no settlement on those terms, the law assumes that the
client must have decided not to approve it. The client, then, must
prevail with the challenging argument, “I would have had a more
attractive decision to make or would have made a different decision, if my attorney had not mishandled things before the moment
when I made my decision.” At least one jurisdiction bars this line
of argumentation entirely. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wrote in Muhammad v Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod
and Gutnick,72 “a suit [cannot] be filed by a dissatisfied plaintiff
against his attorney following a settlement to which that plaintiff
agreed, unless the plaintiff can show he was fraudulently induced

70 See Randall Kiser, Beyond Right and Wrong: The Power of Effective Decision Making for Attorneys and Clients 223 (Springer 2010) (“Although attorneys uniformly
acknowledge the principle that only the client can consent to a settlement, this principle
is strained in actual practice.”).
71 This presumption is rebuttable in a malpractice action, in a third-party action, or
in an action to set aside the settlement. However, in any of those cases, the party seeking
to demonstrate that the attorney lacked the authority will have the burden of producing
evidence to support that assertion. See generally, for example, In re Artha Management,
Inc, 91 F3d 326 (2d Cir 1996). See also Surety Insurance Co of California v Williams, 729
F2d 581, 582–83 (8th Cir 1984) (“Although an attorney is presumed to possess authority
to act on behalf of the client, a judgement entered upon an agreement by the attorney may
be set aside on affirmative proof that the attorney had no right to consent to its entry.”)
(quotation marks omitted), quoting Bradford Exchange v Trein’s Exchange, 600 F2d 99,
102 (7th Cir 1979); St. Amand v Marriott Hotel, Inc, 430 F Supp 488, 490 (ED La 1977):

The law is settled that an attorney of record may not compromise, settle or consent to a final disposition of his client’s case without express authority . . . . However, this general principle must be considered in connection with the rule that
an attorney of record is presumed to have authority to compromise and settle
litigation of his client, and a judgment entered upon an agreement by the attorney of record will be set aside only upon affirmative proof of the party seeking to
vacate the judgment that the attorney had no right to consent to its entry.
(quotation marks omitted). In some cases, of course, those seeking to challenge the settlement are able to meet this burden and demonstrate that an attorney lacked the authority to
settle. See, for example, Blutcher v EHS Trinity Hospital, 746 NE2d 863, 872 (Ill App 2001).
72 587 A2d 1346 (Pa 1991).

1850

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:1825

to settle the original action.”73 This means that even if an attorney’s pre-settlement actions caused unarguable injury to the merits of the client’s case, decreasing both the expected litigation
value and the settlement value of the case,74 a subsequent settlement will cause the client to forfeit any claim against his attorney
unless the client can show that his attorney committed fraud
against her client in addition to whatever earlier malpractice the
client has perceived. Most jurisdictions have declined to follow the
bright-line rule in Muhammad and will at least permit clients
who have settled to bring malpractice actions against attorneys
“if the client can establish that the settlement agreement was the
product of the attorney’s negligence.”75 However, a client in these
states still has the challenge of demonstrating that he does not
now, in hindsight, merely regret the decision to make the deal.76
Second, the intervening decision-maker might be the other
party in the lawsuit. An unhappy client might say, “Yes, there was
a settlement, but if my attorney had been competent, I would have
gotten an even better deal” or “No, there was no settlement, but if
my attorney had been competent, the other side and I would have
reached agreement.” Both of these assertions rely on demonstrating how the other party would have behaved in an alternate universe in which the attorney’s actions fell somewhere within the
broad sphere of ordinary care.
If the client approved—and now regrets—a particular settlement, the client has a high burden in demonstrating that the
other side would have ever agreed to something even more favorable, even if the attorney had acted appropriately. For example,
in a malpractice action against the attorney who represented him
in a divorce proceeding, the client in Marshak v Ballesteros77
alleged that the deal negotiated by his lawyer undervalued the
73

Id at 1348.
Regrettably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not acknowledge the distinction
between the case’s litigation value and its settlement value.
75 Wolski v Wandel, 746 NW2d 143, 149 (Neb 2008). See also Ziegelheim v Apollo,
607 A2d 1298, 1304 (NJ 1992) (rejecting the categorical application of the rule espoused
in Muhammad); Grayson v Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin and Kuriansky, 646 A2d 195, 199–200
(Conn 1994); Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc v Burnett, 555 S2d 455, 456 (Fla App 1990) (“We
cannot say as a matter of law that the settlement of this case negates any alleged legal
malpractice as a proximate cause of loss.”); Pike v Mullikin, 965 A2d 987, 991 (NH 2009)
(spouse who consented to resolution of contested divorce not precluded from bringing subsequent malpractice action against attorney for her role in drafting the contested antenuptial agreement). Even in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit declined to extend the
Muhammad bar in a failure-to-prosecute case. See Wassal v DeCaro, 91 F3d 443, 446 (3d
Cir 1996).
76 See, for example, Elmo v Callahan, 2012 WL 3669010, *8 n 10 (D NH).
77 72 Cal App 4th 1514 (1999).
74
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marital residence and overestimated the accounts receivable in
his business, in ways that prejudiced him in the settlement.78 Upholding the original settlement and dismissing the legal malpractice action, the court noted that “[e]ven if [the client] were able to
prove” that his case was “worth more” than the settlement, “he
would not prevail. For he must also prove that his ex-wife would
have settled for less than she did, or that, following trial, a judge
would have entered judgment more favorable than that to which
he stipulated.”79
In a typical lawsuit, how does a plaintiff demonstrate what
the other side would have done in a theoretical, alternative settlement context? Absent concrete proposals, as one might see in
an offer of judgment context, it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff could demonstrate what offers would have been made or accepted.80 In the lawsuit underlying Rogers v Zanetti,81 the founders of a home-healthcare company accused James Rogers, one of
the company’s investors, of fraud and conspiracy.82 The founders
made an offer to settle the suit in exchange for a payment from
Rogers of $450,000 and full control of the company, but Rogers’s
attorney never communicated the offer to Rogers.83 At trial, a jury
found Rogers liable for fraud, and he subsequently sued his attorney for malpractice. Rogers testified that if he had known about
the founders’ offer, he “would have tried to settle the case” and
“would have instructed [his] attorneys to negotiate the best possible resolution.”84 Rogers’s failure to testify that he would have
outright accepted that offer proved fatal.85 Noting the absence of
record evidence that Rogers would have accepted the $450,000 offer or that the founders would have accepted a different offer, the
Texas Supreme Court found that Rogers could not establish causation.86 Even if a client is legally permitted to present evidence
about their theory of what would have happened in a but-for

78

Id at 1516.
Id at 1519 (emphasis in original).
80 See, for example, Whiteaker v State, 382 NW2d 112, 115–17 (Iowa 1986) (requiring
plaintiff to provide evidence of the specific terms of a settlement that was neither made
nor offered in order to overcome proximate causation burden in a malpractice case).
81 518 SW3d 394 (Tex 2017).
82 Id at 398–99.
83 Id at 410–11.
84 Id at 411.
85 Part of the challenge was that Rogers would have needed to prove not only that he
would have accepted the offer, but also that he would have had funds sufficient to make
the payment in question. Rogers, 518 SW3d at 411.
86 Id at 411.
79
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settlement world, the client will face practical challenges in accessing the relevant evidence. As one court noted, “Absent some
compelling circumstances, the settling adversary in the underlying case is not likely to admit that, had the lawyer held out, it
would have offered substantially more in settlement than was, in
fact, offered.”87
Third, in some contexts, someone other than the litigants and
their attorneys takes action that implicates the chain of causation.88 For example, courts routinely review the substance of proposed settlements in contexts in which nonparties’ interests may
be affected by the terms of the settlement.89 A court’s approval of
a settlement does not generally create formal estoppel in a subsequent malpractice action.90 The need for judicial approval, however, does create a proximate causation problem because the client will need to demonstrate that the court which approved one
settlement agreement would have approved some other, theoretical settlement agreement. For example, in the case underlying
First National Bank of LaGrange v Lowrey,91 the mother of a child
and the bank serving as guardian of the child’s estate brought a
medical malpractice action against a hospital for injuries suffered
at birth.92 The hospital made a settlement offer of $1 million, but
the mother’s attorney rejected it before informing her client of its
existence. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict

87 Thomas v Bethea, 718 A2d 1187, 1197 (Md 1998). These same challenges arise in
the context of alleged attorney misconduct in the context of transactional dealmaking. See,
for example, Viner v Sweet, 70 P3d 1046, 1054 (Cal 2003) (“[J]ust as in litigation malpractice actions, a plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that but for the
alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a
more favorable result.”).
88 In some circumstances, the intervening decisions may be those of another attorney—for example, because the client fired his first one. See, for example, Meiners v Fortson
& White, 436 SE2d 780, 781 (Ga App 1993) (explaining that a first lawyer made errors,
but was shielded from liability on proximate causation grounds because a second attorney
made subsequent errors); Royal Insurance Co of America v Miles & Stockbridge, PC, 138
F Supp 2d 695, 698 (D Md 2001) (compounding errors by series of attorneys, creating what
the court described as a “megaplex of errors already committed by virtually everyone who
had come close to this nettlesome mess”).
89 For a survey of the contexts in which courts commonly review the substantive
terms of settlement agreements, see Sanford L. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements
and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J Legal Stud 55, 77, 81, 83, 92 (1999).
90 See, for example, Meyer v Wagner, 709 NE2d 784, 791 (Mass 1999); Ex parte Free,
910 S2d 753, 756 (Ala 2005) (concluding that plaintiff’s failure to contest a settlement
agreement was immaterial when the complaint alleged that information relating to the
settlement was misrepresented).
91 872 NE2d 447 (Ill App 2007).
92 Id at 455.
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for the hospital.93 The mother then brought a legal malpractice
action against her former attorney. In order to prevail, she needed
not only to prove (1) that the lawyer breached his duty by failing
to communicate the offer, and (2) that she would have accepted it
if she had known about it in a timely way, but also (3) that the
court in the medical malpractice case would have approved that
offer, had it been presented as a proposed resolution of the case.94
In short, although the case-within-a-case method of assessing
causation may work in a litigation malpractice case, the fit is
more challenging with respect to alleged settlement malpractice.
The combination of strategic interactivity and the existence of
multiple iterated decision-makers complicates the landscape, and
the effective result is to make it harder for complaining clients to
prevail.
C.

Damages and Settlement Speculation

Legal malpractice jurisprudence in the litigation context
makes the unarticulated but plain assumption that any harm
caused by an attorney’s mistakes will be reflected in harm to the
client’s litigation outcome. One compares the actual outcome with
the presumed outcome of the case-within-a-case trial, and the difference is deemed the proper damages for the prevailing plaintiff.
For example, in the simplest of cases, assume the plaintiff had a
slam-dunk claim in an action in which a liquidated damages clause
would net the plaintiff exactly $1 million. The plaintiff’s attorney
inexplicably failed to file the complaint, and as a result, the claim
became time-barred. Assuming the plaintiff can demonstrate
through a case-within-a-case trial that his claim would clearly
have been successful but for the attorney’s misconduct, the plaintiff would be entitled to $1 million in damages.
In all but the rarest of cases, however, this basic structure
does not lend itself well to alleged malpractice in the settlement
context. The challenge for courts (and therefore for prospective
plaintiffs) becomes one of establishing the damage caused by an
attorney’s substandard negotiation decisions. Without an established legal procedure for assessing the negotiation-within-acase, or some reliable mechanism for establishing what the results would have been in a negotiation that never occurred, courts

93

Id at 455–56.
This creates a curious litigation posture for defendants like the hospital in this
case. At trial, they argued that their own settlement offer of $1 million was not nearly
enough to cover the plaintiff’s son’s expected medical expenses. Id at 467.
94
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often deem plaintiffs’ claims too speculative in settlement contexts, even when the attorney clearly engaged in harmful substandard conduct.
In peculiar circumstances, clients may be able to point to a
specific measure of damages associated with misconduct. If a client instructs an attorney to accept the other side’s offer, and for
some reason the attorney fails to do so, the client should stand to
recover exactly the benefit of the foregone offer.95 Or perhaps a
client may be able to establish a specific value for at least some
part of the injuries he believes he has suffered because of the attorney’s settlement conduct. For example, in Kliger-Weiss Infosystems v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek,96 the plaintiffs believed (incorrectly) that their attorneys had followed their instructions to
incorporate an evergreen provision into the terms of a settlement
between Klinger-Weiss Infosystems (KWI) and one of its business
partners.97 Four years later, when a dispute arose about the eventual termination of the business relationship, KWI was forced to
defend its position in arbitration. In their ensuing legal malpractice complaint against their former attorneys, KWI alleged that
“but for the defendant’s negligent advice, it would not have executed the [ ] settlement agreement and/or would not have incurred the legal expense of defending the arbitration.”98 The first
half of this assertion raises considerable challenges from a damages perspective, because KWI would be forced to demonstrate
what the settlement or litigation result would have been in a butfor world. But at least the second half—the expenses of defending
a claim in an arbitration that has already occurred—is a knowable, concrete dollar figure that poses no challenge from a damages
perspective.
Typically, however, plaintiffs face a real challenge establishing precise damages in an action in which they are asserting that
a favorable settlement would have been the result in a world without their lawyers’ misconduct.99 What kinds of evidence, beyond
self-serving ex post testimony by the plaintiff, would satisfy the
burden of demonstrating that there would have been a different
offer and that it would have been accepted? As the court in Filbin

95 The client might also have a claim for any unrecovered transaction costs associated with the ensuing litigation because the litigation was unnecessarily caused by the
attorney’s misconduct.
96 159 AD3d 683 (NY App 2018).
97 Id at 683.
98 Id at 684.
99 See, for example, Whiteaker, 382 NW2d at 115–17.
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v Fitzgerald100 noted, “The requirement that a plaintiff need prove
damages to ‘a legal certainty’ is difficult to meet” because “[e]ven
skillful and experienced negotiators do not know whether they received the maximum settlement or paid out the minimum
acceptable.”101
Rather than wade through speculation about the precise
back-and-forth that would have occurred in a negotiation that
never occurred, courts may sometimes permit expert testimony
about what cases “like this” settle for “normally.” Repeat players
in litigation provide one context in which such calculus may be
appropriate. For example, an explosion in 2005 at BP’s Texas City
refinery killed fifteen workers and injured almost two hundred
others.102 BP “made the decision to settle every case arising from
the plant explosion.”103 Jose Elizondo was among the injured
workers, and his attorney negotiated a $50,000 settlement.
Elizondo subsequently alleged that the settlement was “inadequate” and was the product of having been “sold down the river”
by his former attorney.104 To assess the merits of Elizondo’s assertion that the settlement was insufficient, the Texas Supreme
Court opened the door to probabilistic expert testimony in the legal malpractice action, writing:
Here, where the same defendant settled thousands of cases,
and indeed made the business decision to settle all cases and
not try any to a verdict, we see no reason why an expert cannot base his opinion of malpractice damages on a comparison
of what similarly situated plaintiffs obtained from the same

100

211 Cal App 4th 154 (2012).
Id at 166. In Filbin, the plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that they would have
obtained a more favorable settlement but for their attorney’s mistaken advice in an eminent domain case. The court rejected as too speculative the Filbins’ assertion that the
other party would have settled for a more favorable amount but for the attorney’s error.
Id at 171. The negotiation literature broadly supports this hesitation to speculate about
such matters. Outside of exceptionally narrow conditions, one cannot know whether a
Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) exists. Even if one somehow knew such a zone’s precise contours, one would still not know whether agreement would result, much less agreement on any particular terms. See generally Katie Shonk, How to Find the ZOPA in Business Negotiations (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Oct 18, 2018), archived
at http://perma.cc/U8AU-YVCL.
102 The Chemical Safety Board’s report says 15 killed and 180 injured. US Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, BP America Refinery Explosion (Chemical Safety
Board, Mar 20, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/8SAR-BL2C.
103 Elizondo v Krist, 415 SW3d 259, 260, 263 (Tex 2013).
104 Id at 260, 261.
101
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defendant. This data is perhaps the best evidence of the realworld settlement value of the case.105
Outside of the context of legal malpractice claims, a small but
growing industry has developed around the question of the
“value” of pending litigation or prospective cases.106 The initial impetus for such ventures centered on litigation finance, with the
prospect of more efficiently allocating investment resources
against litigation representing desirable risk profiles.107 In many
cases, the algorithms underneath these assessments have proven
more reliable than the judgment of even experienced attorneys.108
Free, online versions of case assessment algorithms now exist.
Even the most commonly used legal research engines now provide
services that include data about settlements and verdicts.109 I am
not aware of any court using such services in the context of a settlement malpractice case, but it is not a leap to imagine that expert testimony (such as that which is provided in breach of contract or intellectual property infringement cases) might form the
basis for one means of at least putting parameters around malpractice damages.
Absent exceptional circumstances or persuasive apples-toapples external benchmarking, however, a plaintiff will have a
real challenge in proving that the other party in this case would

105 Id at 263. Elizondo’s claim was dismissed on summary judgment, however, because the Texas Supreme Court judged the expert’s assessment of the relationship between this aggregated settlement data and the plaintiff’s settlement to be “too conclusory.”
Id at 265. But see Fishman v Brooks, 487 NE2d 1377, 1380 (Mass 1986) (permitting expert
testimony as “evidence of the fair settlement value of the underlying claim”).
106 See, for example, Biz Carson, One of Peter Thiel’s Fellows Created a New Startup
That Will Fund Your Lawsuit (Business Insider, Aug 24, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/8KL3-HEK7; Business Solutions: Manage Legal Cost and Risk (Burford
2019), archived at http://perma.cc/DY32-EU2V.
107 See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 Georgetown L J 65, 101–04 (2010) (discussing litigation financing as a means
toward a more robust litigation market); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 Vill L Rev 83,
102 (2008). See also generally Blakeley B. McShane, et al, Predicting Securities Fraud
Settlements and Amounts: A Hierarchical Bayesian Model of Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 482 (2012) (developing models to predict incidence
and amounts of securities fraud settlements).
108 See, for example, Charlotte Alexander, Using Analytics to Detect Legal Risk
(Brink, May 8, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/5LVY-T3TU (finding an artificial intelligence tool 20 percent more accurate than judgments of 100 lawyers from top London
firms).
109 See, for example, Capitalize on Intelligence from Prior Case Outcomes: LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement Analyzer: Case Assessment and Planning (LexisNexis
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/3YE2-7Y76; Westlaw Case Evaluator (Thomson Reuters), archived at http://perma.cc/CU83-867U.
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have made an attractive offer, that this client in this case would
have accepted it, and the specific terms of that hypothetical offer.110 The result is that our malpractice system, which contemplates the lawyer-as-litigator, makes it tremendously difficult for
any client to bring a successful action against his lawyer for alleged settlement misconduct.
III. THE MODERN REALITY OF LAWYER-AS-SETTLOR
The current legal malpractice system falls short with respect
to lawyers’ settlement conduct. But it need not be so. Lawyers’
settlement-related duties are clear enough that ex post examination is both possible and appropriate.111 The effects of lawyers’ settlement advice and conduct are not so hopelessly complex to be
treated as intolerably speculative. The prescriptions from the negotiation literature are virtually uniform. Applied to the lawyeras-settlor context, these best practices create conditions in which
clients can reasonably expect competent services from their attorneys. And attorneys who fail to adhere to these practices—both
with respect to the advice they provide to their clients and with
respect to the conduct of settlement negotiations—ought not to
enjoy the de facto immunity that attaches to a malpractice system
that is based on the vision of lawyer-as-litigator.
A.

Lawyer-as-Settlement-Advisor: Helping Clients to Weigh
the Prospects of Settlement

Properly understood, a lawyer has three distinct but related
roles with respect to her client’s decision-making about settlement. The lawyer must understand her client’s interests—the
“needs, desires, concerns, and fears” that motivate negotiators’

110 One interesting analytical approach was suggested in Glenna v Sullivan, 245
NW2d 869 (Minn 1976). The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision
to direct a verdict against a plaintiff who had alleged that her attorney had negligently
prepared for her case and had, therefore, recommended an inadequate settlement. Id at
869, 873. Justice John J. Todd, concurring with the decision to dismiss the appeal, examined the substance of the settlement and assessed it as though it were a jury verdict being
reviewed for additur purposes, writing, “The settlement amount, in my judgment, represents the low range of jury verdict which would be sustained without additur if the case
had been properly prepared and tried.” Id at 873 (Todd concurring in the judgment).
111 If lawyers’ settlement duties were so nebulous that it was impossible to distinguish
competence from incompetence, then clearly deference—or even blanket immunity—
might be required. As I explain below, however, there are at least some settlement-related
duties that are so universally recognized as to permit examination and a reasonable expectation that those duties will be satisfied.
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decisions,112 akin to what the Model Rules describe as the “objectives of representation.”113 She must communicate the implications of any potential settlement—what the negotiation literature
refers to as “options”114—with a specific eye toward the ways in
which that settlement option intersects with the client’s interests.
And she must provide the client with a candid and accurate picture of litigation’s risks, costs, and opportunities.115 A lawyer’s
mishandling of any of these represents—or at least should represent—both a breach of the lawyer’s ethical duties116 and a clear
instance of professional malpractice.117
1. Interests.
At the core of an attorney’s ability to advise her client effectively is an understanding of the client’s interests. Because settlements can—and often do—have terms that exceed the court’s
narrow remedial powers, clients face a complex decision. On the
one hand, litigation presents some probability that the court will
exercise its power in a way that redistributes property or rights
between the litigants. On the other hand, a potential settlement
represents a consensual allocation of property or rights between
the litigants, potentially in ways that do not align precisely with
how a court might allocate them. Making the choice between

112 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes 42 (Houghton Mifflin 1981). See also
Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning at 37 (cited in note 4) (“[U]nderlying
interests are the stuff of which value-creating trades are made.”); Robbennolt and
Sternlight, Psychology for Lawyers at 256–60 (cited in note 39) (giving an overview of some
of the real-world challenges of assessing client interests). I treat interests here as a slightly
broader category than the Model Rules’ dictates about the “objectives of representation,”
because I have heard some suggest that “of representation” creates a narrowing of considerations. A client has interests that may or may not be related to a specific representation
only by virtue of whether litigation takes a particular turn, or by whether a creative clause
is inserted into a settlement.
113 Model Rules, Rule 1.2(a).
114 See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes at 59 (cited in note 112).
115 Even in a litigation context, a lawyer’s role properly extends beyond this simple
duty. A lawyer whose client faces a high-profile lawsuit may coordinate with a crisis communication team, for example, to help the client to understand the risks and opportunities
associated with actions that may or may not have any effect on either settlement or litigation. A lawyer whose client is in need of social services or other resources may find ways
to help him access those services in ways that have no effect on the immediate litigation
or its settlement. See Model Rules, Rule 1.0(e) (discussing communication of material
risks).
116 See, for example, Model Rules, Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(b) (describing the scope
of representation and a lawyer’s responsibility to communicate with the client).
117 Not all cases of legal malpractice will be violations of legal ethics and vice versa.
See Mallen, 1 Legal Malpractice § 1:22 at 53 (cited in note 19); Mallen, 2 Legal Malpractice
§ 20:9 at 1358–59 (cited in note 46).
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these two possible paths raises apples-and-oranges problems. The
common currency, the means of comparison from the client’s perspective, is the degree to which each satisfies his most important
interests.118 In order to serve a useful settlement advisor function,
therefore, a lawyer must understand those interests.
2. Settlement options.
In order to exercise informed choice, a client must understand the implications of a proposed settlement option, and in
particular examine the ways in which it does or does not satisfy
the client’s interests. A number of dollars, a particular release or
waiver clause, a confidentiality provision, a dispute resolution
clause, a joint press statement, a contingent clause—any might
be options that would take effect only if both parties agreed to
them, and each might affect the client’s interests. Assessing and
articulating the implications of options, therefore, becomes central to the role of lawyer-as-settlement-advisor.119
At a bare minimum, an attorney must convey the basic terms
of an agreement accurately to the client. In the case underlying
Arnav Industries, Inc Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman,
Millstein, Felder & Steiner,120 for example, the terms of a settlement were reached, but the next day, the plaintiffs’ attorney sent
a revised agreement for their signature, indicating that there had
been a typographical error in the original.121 The plaintiffs signed
the revised agreement without rereading it, only later to discover
that the sheets they signed included a number of changes resulting in a roughly $4 million reduction to what the plaintiffs would
be owed upon the default of the opposing party to the settlement.122 The court in the subsequent malpractice lawsuit held—
appropriately—that this plainly states a cause of action against
the plaintiffs’ original attorney.123 Attorneys must also accurately

118 And when clients have multiple interests, a lawyer needs to know the relative
strengths of those interests. Otherwise, she will be left to make judgments on behalf of the
client—judgments that more properly lie with the client. See, for example, Arden v
Forsberg & Umlauf, 373 P3d 320, 334–35 (Wash App 2016) (explaining that the client had
personal as well as pecuniary interests in a case, leaving the lawyer to exercise judgment
about those interests’ relative weight or importance in settlement negotiations).
119 See Model Rules, Rule 1.4.
120 751 NE2d 936 (NY 2001).
121 The original agreement had noted the settlement amount as $2,800,000 rather
than $2,080,000. Id at 937.
122 Id.
123 Id at 938.
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explain certain conspicuous deal terms, such as an amount of payment124 or the identities of the parties who will be bound.125
More commonly, a client may not understand the implications of some inconspicuous deal term, particularly to the extent
it may have an effect on the client’s interests extending beyond
the immediate case in question. For example, in the suit underlying Ordon v Karpie,126 Dr. Andrew Ordon faced a complaint before
the Connecticut Medical Examining Board.127 His attorney negotiated a potential settlement according to which Ordon would pay
a $2,500 fine to the State of Connecticut but would face no restrictions on his practice.128 Indeed, Ordon’s attorney “told Dr.
Ordon that accepting the [o]ffer would have ‘essentially no import’
on him or his practice in Connecticut or any other jurisdiction.”129
Relying on this advice, Ordon accepted and paid the fine. However, on the basis of the settlement’s consent order, both California
and New York subsequently instituted reciprocal discipline on
Ordon that impaired his ability to establish practices in those states.
Ordon alleged that he would not have agreed to the settlement in
Connecticut if he had known about the implications elsewhere.130
Similarly, in Collas v Garnick,131 the plaintiff was injured in
an automobile accident and brought a claim against the owner of

124 But see Berman v Rubin, 227 SE2d 802, 804 (Ga App 1976) (concluding that a
plaintiff who read and accepted terms of settlement has no case for legal malpractice
against an attorney who provided inadequate explanation of those settlement terms).
125 Even as to this, lawyers must sometimes take great care in describing the implications of deal terms to their clients. See, for example, Gulliver Schools, Inc v Snay, 137
S3d 1045, 1046 (Fla App 2014). As part of the settlement of an age discrimination suit,
Patrick Snay agreed to a confidentiality clause providing that he would not communicate
even the existence of a settlement, much less its terms, to anyone other than his attorneys
or other professional advisors. Snay informed his teenage daughter that the case had been
settled and that he was happy. Id. His daughter then posted a message to social media
reading, “Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially
paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT” (teenage caps in original). The
court treated this as a breach and refused to compel Gulliver to pay Snay the settlement.
Id at 1046. Surely a lawyer might have been able to help Snay to consider the implications
of the wording of the confidentiality clause.
126 425 F Supp 2d 276 (D Conn 2006).
127 Id at 277.
128 Id at 277–78.
129 Id at 278.
130 See Ordon, 425 F Supp 2d at 278. Ordon ultimately lost his legal malpractice claim
against the attorney who provided this advice because he was unable to prove, through
expert testimony, that he would have prevailed in the action before the Connecticut board.
Id at 280–82. The court reasoned that Ordon would have suffered the same extrajurisdictional fate if he had lost before the medical board, so unless he could prove that he would
have won in that action, Ordon could not establish proximate causation. Id.
131 624 A2d 117 (Pa Super 1993).
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the other vehicle involved.132 The plaintiff’s attorney negotiated
the terms of a potential settlement and presented it to his client,
assuring her that “the release would have [no] impact upon her
plan to sue the manufacturer of the vehicle in which she had been
riding.”133 The plaintiff signed the settlement and subsequently
brought an action against the manufacturer of the seat belts in
her car. The trial court barred that subsequent action on the basis
of the general waiver she had already signed. She, therefore,
brought a malpractice action against her attorney for breaching
his duty to provide her with accurate counsel about the extent to
which the proposed settlement would satisfy her interests.134
The scope of a lawyer’s advisory duties in this context is not,
in most contexts, so abstract and boundless as some courts appear
to suggest. Instead, the proper question is simply, “What impacts
would this proposed settlement package have on my client’s interests, as I understand them?”135 No lawyer has discharged her
lawyer-as-settlement-advisor duties professionally if she has not
provided information about how a proposed settlement would address the client’s relevant interests.
3. Nonsettlement alternatives.
In order to decide wisely about whether to settle a lawsuit,
clients must have an understanding of their alternative(s) to settlement. Each party is presumed to have a number of different
courses of action it could conceivably pursue if there were no
agreement—courses of action that do not require the consent of
the other side. Proceed with litigation as planned? Call a press
conference? Join other parties to the litigation? Add claims or defenses? Forfeit the litigation? From among this list, whatever specific course of action a party deems to be best at satisfying its interests is deemed that party’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement (or BATNA, in the nearly universal parlance of the
literature).136
If a lawyer provides poor advice about the client’s BATNA,
the client is plainly deprived of the ability to make an informed
132

Id at 119.
Id.
134 Id at 119–21.
135 In the simplest of contexts, the lawyer is helping her client to make a binary choice:
to settle on these terms or to resolve the case through litigation. As a practical matter,
clients often perceive the choice to be more complex: to settle on these terms, or to continue
with litigation, while still holding out the hope that a more attractive settlement offer may
emerge later in the course of litigation.
136 See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes at 99–108 (cited in note 112).
133
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choice. A lawyer tells her client, “I’m ninety-nine percent sure this
case is going to be won” and “[t]here’s always that one in a million
chance that some fluke strange thing can happen and you’d lose
but it’s not going to happen here,”137 but then the client loses the
case. Another lawyer advises her client that a settlement is reasonable based on expected litigation outcomes—even though she
had not investigated the defendant’s available assets.138 A client
followed a third lawyer’s advice and settled with three defendant
landlords for a total of $2,500 in a lead paint case—even though
subsequent investigation revealed that the attorney had never
even served one of the parties and that the unserved party carried
a $300,000 insurance policy to cover such claims.139 A fourth attorney urges a client to resist paying their neighbor’s request for
$19,000 to contribute to repairs on a shared, private road. The
client winds up owing the neighbors the full amount of the repairs,
owing their own attorney $380,000, and owing the neighbors’ attorneys roughly $580,000 under a fee-shifting arrangement.140
The best practice for attorneys in helping their clients to exercise informed choice in the face of the future uncertainties inherent in litigation likely involves the use of some form of litigation risk analysis (LRA). LRA methodology builds on decades of
research and application in a wide range of fields beyond litigation.141 Although LRA can be completed effectively in its basic

137 Sauer v Flanagan and Maniotis, 748 S2d 1079, 1080 (Fla App 2000) (the lawyer
also said the client would be “crazy” to accept a million-dollar settlement offer). In her
subsequent legal malpractice action, the plaintiff survived summary judgment, and the
case was settled in mediation, with the terms of the settlement filed under seal. See Sauer
v Flanagan and Maniotis, Docket No 237 (Fla App filed Sept 5, 2000). But see Miranda v
Said, 836 NW2d 8, 11, 13 (Iowa 2013) (attorney told clients his proposed course of action
for entry into the United States presented “no risks and had a ninety-nine percent chance
of success” despite obstacles that experts later opined made the plan legally untenable).
138 See Grayson v Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin and Kuriansky, 646 A2d 195, 203 (Conn 1994).
139 See Thomas v Bethea, 718 A2d 1187, 1195–96 (Md 1998).
140 See Charnay v Cobert, 145 Cal App 4th 170, 176 (2006).
141 The analytic approach underlying LRA coalesced in its current form in 1964 with
the work of Professors Howard Raiffa and Ronald Howard, and the term “decision analysis” was coined. See Justin Fox, How to Tell if You’ve Made a Good Decision (Harvard
Business Review, Nov 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/C8FB-DZ9T (describing
Raiffa and Howard as cofounders of the “[d]ecision analysis” field). See also generally
Marjorie Corman Aaron, Risks & Rigor: A Lawyer’s Guide to Decision Trees for Assessing
Cases and Advising Clients (DRI 2018); Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (cited in
note 63); David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator’s Tool, 1 Harv Negotiation L Rev
113 (1996); Marjorie Corman Aaron and David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Method of
Evaluating the Trial Alternative, in Dwight Golann, ed, Mediating Legal Disputes 307–34
(Little, Brown 1996); John S. Hammond, Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, Smart
Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions (Harvard Business School 2002).
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forms with no more than middle school algebra, specialized software has existed for at least two decades to assist lawyers and
other professionals in precisely this kind of activity.142 LRA can
serve a “clarifying and calibrating”143 function by attaching numbers to a lawyer’s adjectival pronouncements. It can provide the
kind of visualization without which “a client may simply be unable to process the available information readily due to the degree
of complexity.”144 And it holds the prospect of helping lawyers and
clients to understand the impacts of probability distributions, unearthing situations in which clients are sensitive to particular
outcomes or ranges of outcomes.
There are, of course, complications with litigation risk analysis. Attaching numbers risks creating a false sense of certainty,
particularly if LRA is used to summarize a case into a single expected value. A client who is told simply that his case is “worth
$1,500,000” has no sense of the shape of the distribution curve
leading to this probabilistic conclusion, and even no sense of the
likelihood of a $0 recovery or some other extreme outcome. A
heavily quantitative approach risks inaccurately suggesting that
financial payoffs are the only (or even most important) interest a
client has, or should have, in deciding on a proper course of action.
Virtually all clients have interests that extend beyond monetary
terms. Even if it is possible to reduce nonmonetary interests into
monetary valuations (“achieving certainty this year is worth
$100,000 to me” or “not setting a bad precedent is worth paying
double on this settlement”), the reduction to a single monetary
term risks suggesting false or misleading equivalents for clients.
Furthermore, even if one is confident in the basic notion of
LRA, lawyers’ ability to conduct such analyses on behalf of their
clients is imperfect. If the variables on which the formulas rely
are unreliable, the products of the underlying calculations will
also be unreliable. “Garbage in, garbage out” may overstate the
matter, but not entirely. Lawyers face a number of structural and
analytic barriers to producing reliably accurate predictions,145 and
142 See generally, for example, Hoffer, 1 Harv Negotiation L Rev (cited in note 141);
Jeffrey M. Senger, Decision Analysis in Negotiation, 87 Marq L Rev 723 (2004).
143 Marjorie Corman Aaron, Finding Settlement with Numbers, Maps, and Trees, in
Moffitt and Bordone, The Handbook of Dispute Resolution at 204 (cited in note 54).
144 Id at 205.
145 For a useful overview of these difficulties, see Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law *66 (Michigan Law & Econ Working Paper, Mar 12, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/76P9-47R2:

Outcome prediction has always been a vital part of practicing law. Clients of all
types rely on their attorneys to provide accurate assessments of the potential
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these challenges have been demonstrated empirically.146 In some
contexts, experienced lawyers may be able to dampen some of the
biases that tarnish these predictions.147 And there is reason to believe that the advent of big data analytics will improve lawyers’
ability to make more accurate litigation predictions.148 Still, even
experienced lawyers, armed with identical information about
cases, commonly produced widely varied predictions about legal
outcomes. In short, many lawyers may be quite inept at providing
the kind of predictive services on which LRA depends.
From a malpractice perspective, there are complications
about the degree of accuracy we can reasonably expect. What
buffer or margin of error is tolerably within the scope of “reasonable care” when making such predictions?149 If a lawyer tells her
client that he has a 10 percent chance of recovery, and a panel of
experts subsequently determines that the client’s chances of recovery were actually 15 percent, one would expect that we would
not consider that lawyer’s assessment to have been negligently
mistaken. One would expect that if the chances of recovery were
actually 90 percent, the client would be justifiably disappointed
in the lawyer’s advice. The law has no clear line about the precision and accuracy clients ought to be able to expect of their attorneys’ predictions.

legal consequences the clients face when making important decisions. And yet,
notwithstanding its enormous importance to the practice of law, outcome prediction in the law remains a very imprecise endeavor.
See also generally Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction–Or–How I Learned
to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services
Industry, 62 Emory L J 909 (2013).
146 See, for example, Jane Goodman-Delahunty, et al, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 Psychology Pub Pol & Law 133, 139–48 (2010).
147 There is some evidence, for example, that lawyers who consult with another colleague produce more reliable predictions than those who rely on their own assessments.
Edie Green and Brian Bornstein, Cloudy Forecasts, 47-Apr Trial 28, 31–32 (2011).
148 See, for example, Theodore W. Ruger, et al, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
104 Colum L Rev 1150, 1171 (2004) (showing that a statistical model outperforms a panel
of legal experts in predicting Supreme Court cases).
149 Perhaps state offer of judgment statutes might provide some guidance about the
magnitude of an appropriate buffer. The basic structure of offer of judgment statutes is
that a party who rejects a qualifying offer and fails to achieve a better outcome at trial
will be liable to the offering party for certain expenses incurred after the offer was made.
Some states provide a cushion in these assessments. See, for example, Alaska Stat Ann
§ 09.30.065 (giving a 5 percent cushion); 2 Mich Ct Rules Prac, Rule 2.403(O)(3) (giving a
10 percent cushion); Fla Stat § 768.79 (2018) (giving a 25 percent cushion). I fear that our
lawyer-driven system would likely choose to hold attorneys to a lesser level of precision in
their predictions, even though we punish clients for “unreasonably” rejecting offers outside
of that interval.
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The fact that LRA presents complications, however, does not
lead to the conclusion that clients cannot reasonably expect some
degree of specificity or accuracy in their lawyers’ predictions. For
clients to exercise meaningful choice, they must have some means
by which to compare alternative paths. Unlike litigation decisions, which are plainly strategically interactive in a way that
merits some level of judgmental deference, attorneys’ advice to
their clients holds no strategic interactivity. Such advice, therefore, does not deserve the same level of deference. And it is so
central to the role of lawyer-as-settlement-advisor that some set
of professional expectations must attach to it.
B.

Lawyers, Paper Trails, and Accountability for Oral Advice

Each of the three duties described above (exploring the full
range of relevant interests, assessing settlement options against
those interests, and articulating the risks and opportunities associated with litigation) is central to the role of lawyer-as-settlementadvisor. Each has grounding in both existing articulations of legal
ethics and the negotiation literature. One might imagine that
with clear duties, it would be relatively easy to demonstrate
breach or compliance.
And yet, my review of the 125 malpractice cases described in
Part I suggests that there is often no shared understanding of
what the lawyer actually did, much less whether that (alleged)
conduct measured up to the relevant standard of care.150 In short,
many in the legal profession—particularly in the settlement context—appear to operate routinely without any discernable paper
trail or other dispositive record about their conduct or advice.151
The initial fight, therefore, in a settlement malpractice contest, is

150 See, for example, Jones v Lattimer, 29 F Supp 3d 5, 13 (DDC 2014) (finding triable
fact in which the client said that her attorney “never advised [her] of the risk associated
with turning down” settlement offers of $3 million and $1 million); Clark v Bristol-Myers
Squibb & Co, 306 AD2d 82, 84 (NY App 2003) (finding triable issue of fact whether the
plaintiff in a silicone breast implant case had authorized her attorney to agree to settlement on a particular set of terms); Bastys v Rothschild, 154 Fed Appx 260, 263 (2d Cir
2005) (finding that plaintiff alleged that attorney’s advice to settle a divorce action was
negligent, but dismissing the claim on summary judgment grounds because the plaintiff
could not demonstrate that the attorney-defendant had given that advice).
151 The demise (or at least decline) of lengthy, formal client memoranda is not recent.
See, for example, Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscone, From Snail Mail to E-mail: The Traditional Legal Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J Legal Educ 32, 34–35
(2008) (describing survey results showing a reduced use of formal legal memoranda in the
practice of law). A paper trail need not be so onerous or costly as these memos, however.
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often not about whether a lawyer’s advice or conduct was adequate, but rather about what the lawyer’s advice or conduct actually was.
Confidentiality is foundational to most conceptions of the
lawyer-client relationship.152 It does not follow from that, however, that lawyers’ advice to their clients—or the protocols for developing that advice—necessarily must be unwritten. When I
went into the doctor recently for a relatively simple medical procedure, my physician gave me a form outlining her diagnosis, her
recommendation, and the expected results and risks associated
with the procedure. Roughly the same was true when I recently
took wakesurfing lessons. And the same was true when I went in
for physical therapy (not unrelated to the aforementioned
wakesurfing). When I have received savings advice from my investment advisor, I received her summary in writing, and the
same was true when I hired someone to fix the cabinets in my
kitchen. On what basis has the legal profession resisted this relatively low-cost mechanism to improve the quality and reliability
of this critical information?
Perhaps the process of advising clients about settlement
would lend itself well to the development of a practice-informed
checklist. Although some professionals initially balk at the notion
that their practice has any routine aspects that would lend themselves to such summaries, Atul Gawande recounts in his publication of The Checklist Manifesto that airline pilots have long used
pretakeoff checklists, refined through years of testing.153 Checklists have gained prominence in settings ranging from high-end
cuisine to rock concert productions.154 Notably, in one set of experiments, physicians across the world saw a 36 percent decrease in
major surgical complications and a 47 percent decrease in surgical death rates after the introduction of checklists.155 Such checklists contain nothing novel.156 Indeed, their purpose is not to introduce new ideas, but rather to assure—really assure—that
everyone involved is on the same page, particularly when the
stakes are high. Why not in settlement conversations?
152 Compare Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . and Its
Exceptions . . ., 81 Neb L Rev 1320, 1321 (2002), with Louis Kaplow and Stephen Shavell,
Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,
102 Harv L Rev 565, 608–13 (1989).
153 See generally Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right
(Metropolitan Books 2009).
154 Id at 80–81.
155 Id at 154.
156 Id at Appx 4 (“A checklist is NOT a teaching tool or an algorithm.”).
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Whether in checklist form, an opinion letter, or even as part
of a routine intake form, it is not difficult to imagine a paper trail
version of any of the three duties listed in the subsection immediately above. A client with the opportunity to review how his attorney has articulated or summarized his interests has the
chance to correct misunderstandings before they ripen into injury.157 An attorney with a well-written explanation of the implications of a proposed settlement simultaneously serves her client’s interest in informed consent and protects herself from a
subsequent accusation that she did not adequately explain the
agreement. And much of the point of litigation risk analysis is the
creation of a shared visual, which presumes that it is written or
otherwise recorded. Even if the profession has not yet developed
the norm of conducting formal litigation risk analysis as part of
settlement counseling, it is plain that every articulation of lawyers’ duties includes the obligation to assure that the client is sufficiently informed about the choices he faces.
The most common objection to the creation of paper trails is
that they involve additional transaction costs—costs clients are
unwilling to bear. At the conceptual level, it is unarguably true
that there would be some additional cost associated with producing written advice. In a small-stakes piece of litigation, any additional attorney time could constitute a meaningful percentage of
the value of the dispute. I am skeptical, however, of this as a blanket justification or explanation. Recall, we are assuming that the
attorney has already invested the appropriate hours to formulate
competent advice. The question is about the marginal investment
of time required to write that advice down—to capture that which
the attorney has already communicated orally to the client. Compared with the array of other legal expenses associated with most
forms of litigation, a written record of settlement-related advice
is unlikely to constitute the kind of factor driving litigation costs
for clients.
What if it were the norm for lawyers to produce written records of their settlement advice?158 In most cases, one would expect
157 An additional benefit to written records is that they can, in some circumstances,
facilitate clearer communication when the client’s native language does not match that of
the lawyer. In Ram v Cooper, for example, the client wrote his attorney, saying, “Since, I
am not well versed in English Language, I prefer all communication to be in writing to
prevent any misconception in any manner or form. What is there that you can only say in
private and not in writing?” Ram, 2002 WL 31772008 at *9.
158 One interesting possibility would be that if written advice were the professional
norm, we might see courts shift the presumptions or burdens in a legal malpractice action
in which there was no written record of the advice. In other words, perhaps the thumb
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to see malpractice actions leapfrog over the “my lawyer told me
X”—“did not”—“did too” phase, directly to the question of the advice’s adequacy. Lawyers would be protected from inaccurate
characterizations of their oral advice, and clients would be protected from lawyers mischaracterizing their oral advice. Perhaps
there would be some risk that written accounts of the lawyer’s
advice would be at such a level of abstraction that clients would
derive no meaningful guidance. (“All litigation comes with risks.”)
Or perhaps the paper trail would go the opposite direction, including so much boilerplate, detail, or jargon that clients would similarly find no real guidance.159 One would expect that a client who
received unhelpful oral advice of either of these flavors from his
attorney would object and seek greater specificity.160 Given the
risks of miscommunication or of subsequent disputes about the contents of that advice, it is hard to conceive that lawyers should stand
apart from the common practices of so many other professions.
C.

Recognizing the Full Value of Settlement Choices

A malpractice system harmonized with the realities of modern settlement lawyering would not only recognize the lawyers’
duties I enumerate in Part III.A, but also would include a recognition that lawyers’ misconduct can create injuries in ways or in
degrees different from their impacts in a litigation context. Settlements, unlike litigation, are rarely winner-take-all, and instead

would be on the scale in favor of the complaining client if his attorney cannot produce a
record of the advice.
159 One might look to contract provisions such as license agreements or arbitration
clauses for a cautionary example in this regard. See Jeff Sovern, et al, “Whimsy Little
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 Md L Rev 1, 43–62 (2015) (using empirical methods
to find prevalent and profound misunderstandings of arbitration clauses); Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J Legal Stud 1, 32 (2014) (finding that
less than 0.2 percent of consumers read online end user license agreements with any care).
But neither of those purports to be an encapsulation of advice from one with a fiduciary
duty to the recipient. The better, although still perhaps cautionary, model might be the
medical profession, in which we still sometimes see consent forms bordering on the meaningless. See, for example, Melissa M. Bottrell, et al, Hospital Informed Consent for Procedure Forms: Facilitating Quality Patient-Physician Interaction, 135 Archives Surgery 26,
29 (2000) (finding only 26.4 percent of hospital forms contained all basic elements of informed consent).
160 There are contexts in which an attorney’s oral advice might mismatch her written
advice. Recall, for example, Sauer, in which the attorney allegedly assured the client that
he had a 99 percent chance of success, but refused to document that assessment in writing.
Sauer, 748 S2d at 1080.
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are often the product of probabilistic assessments and corresponding allocations. Settlements, unlike litigation, often produce
non-zero-sum outcomes. And settlements, unlike litigation, place
clients conspicuously in the posture of having agency or choice
over the path they wish to pursue. In this Section, I return to each
of these aspects of modern settlement, with an eye toward envisioning a malpractice regime consistent with those realities.
1. Accounting for probabilistic assessments.
The most problematic feature of the case-within-a-case approach is that it reduces cases to binary, all-or-nothing outcomes.161 As a result, it misallocates damages in many litigation
contexts and is even worse with respect to settlement. The good
news, though, is that by acknowledging simultaneously the roles
that probabilities and settlement play in modern litigation, both
of these problematic features are dampened, if not eliminated.
To illustrate the challenge of the current system, consider
four hypothetical cases in which lawyers who engage in roughly
similar malpractice are subject to wildly different treatment. In
each, assume that the plaintiff will receive $1 million if he wins,
and $0 if he loses. Assume that there are no litigation costs, and
that we are able to know with certainty the likelihood of each possible litigation outcome.162 The lawyer in our hypothetical commits an error163 that has the effect of decreasing the chances that
the plaintiff, her client, will win at trial.
a) Scenario 1. Prior to the lawyer’s error, the plaintiff had
a 70 percent chance of prevailing, but as a result of the error, the
plaintiff entered the trial with a 40 percent chance of winning. We
will assume, therefore, that in 60 percent of such cases, the plaintiff loses and brings a malpractice action against his attorney. The
current system’s case-within-a-case approach would conclude
that the plaintiff in every one of those malpractice cases “would
have” won in the but-for world in which the attorney did not make
161 This ignores the reality that a litigator’s substandard decisions are rarely, in fact,
dispositive by themselves. Instead, most substandard decisions within a litigation context
merely decrease the client’s likelihood of prevailing. But the current system, relying on a
case-within-a-case approach, recognizes only a subset of lawyer misconduct as injurious—
and then often overcompensates clients in those instances.
162 In the real world, neither of these conditions is likely. See, for example, Randall
Kiser, Beyond Right and Wrong at 20–24 (cited in note 70); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J Econ 404, 406–09 (1984).
163 Assume, for example, that the lawyer failed to give notice of an expert witness,
and as a result, will have a much harder (but not impossible) time prevailing on one of the
necessary elements of the plaintiff’s claim.
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a mistake, because the plaintiff’s original odds of winning were
greater than 50 percent.164 The plaintiff, therefore, would stand to
recover the full value of the litigation—$1 million.
b) Scenario 2. Prior to the lawyer’s error, the plaintiff had
a 40 percent chance of prevailing, but as a result of the error, the
plaintiff entered the trial with a 10 percent chance of winning.
There is a 90 percent chance that the plaintiff will lose the case,
and, as in Scenario 1, we will assume that the plaintiff in these
cases brings a malpractice action against the attorney. The current system’s case-within-a-case approach would conclude that
the plaintiff “would have” lost even in the but-for world in which
the attorney did not make a mistake, because the plaintiff’s original odds of winning were less than 50 percent. The plaintiff,
therefore, would stand to recover nothing against the attorney—
even though the attorney unarguably decreased the plaintiff’s
likelihood of winning. The law treats the client here as though he
suffered no injury.165
Scenarios 1 and 2 involve identical errors, producing probabilistic harms of identical magnitude. In each, the attorney’s error
caused her client’s prospects at trial to drop by 30 percent. But
the current system treats the plaintiff in one as though he deserves to have the attorney serve as guarantor of the entire value
of the case, while treating the plaintiff in the other case as though
he suffered no injury at all. In this sense, Scenario 2 mirrors the
scenarios that have given rise to the debate over the “loss of
chance” doctrine.166

164 Recall that the case-within-a-case methodology relies on a preponderance of the
evidence standard. Mallen, 4 Legal Malpractice § 37:97 at 1730 (cited in note 68) (“evidence that, more likely than not, the attorney’s conduct caused injury”). It would not differentiate between an 80 percent case, a 55 percent case, and a 99.44 percent case.
165 For more on the distinction between “moral wrongs” and “legal wrongs,” see John
C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex L Rev 917, 930–32
(2010). For more discussion of the difference between causation and the value of a claim,
see Joseph H. King Jr, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 Yale L J 1353, 1354 (1981)
(“Courts have had difficulty perceiving that a chance of avoiding some adverse result or of
achieving some favorable result is a compensable interest in its own right.”).
166 If a doctor fails to diagnose a patient’s cancer, and a properly diagnosed patient
would have had a 30 percent chance of recovery, the patient has a cause of action against
his doctor only in some jurisdictions. See, for example, Matsuyama v Birnbaum, 890 NE2d
819, 842 (Mass 2008) (allowing recovery when the defendant doctor’s negligence was the
but-for cause of patient’s “loss of chance”); Roberts v Ohio Permanente Medical Group, Inc,
668 NE2d 480, 482 (Ohio 1996) (recognizing claims for “loss of chance” in wrongful death
actions). The loss of chance doctrine has not, however, as a general rule, extended to the
context of alleged legal malpractice, and the scholarly debate about the wisdom of such an
expansion continues. Compare, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice:
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What the current system is missing is a recognition of the
roles that probability and settlement routinely play in the course
of modern litigation. There is a distinction between a case’s litigation value (LV) and its settlement value (SV), with the latter
being a function of the former. But in a simplified world, one
might assume that a decrease in a case’s expected LV would have
a corresponding negative impact on its SV, and so one could helpfully consider the effects of the lawyer on her client’s case’s LV.167
The lawyer’s actions in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 decreased the LV of her client’s case by $300,000.168 Recovering this
amount—rather than the $1 million or $0 result suggested by the
case-within-a-case method—would truly return the plaintiff to
the position he was in before his lawyer committed malpractice.169
In making this observation, I do not mean to suggest that in
the real-world we could assume that the plaintiff would have been
able to reach a settlement in the case for any particular amount,
much less the specific amount represented by the case’s LV. What
I do urge, however, is that a modern legal malpractice system
ought to compensate—rather than overcompensate or undercompensate—clients with cases whose value was diminished by the
actions of their attorneys. And by incorporating the probabilities
involved, along with the prospect of settlement, the system
achieves the goal of returning the injured client to the position he
was in before the malpractice occurred.

Reforming the Legal Profession 166 (Oxford 2000) (describing the burden of showing quantifiable damage as a significant barrier to recovery); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions: Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37
San Diego L Rev 401, 426 (2000) (discussing high causation standards as a major failure
of the legal malpractice regime), with John C.P. Goldberg, What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and Loss of a Chance, 52 Emory L J 1201, 1210 (2003)
(“[E]ven if the argument holds for [the loss of chance doctrine to apply to] doctors in some
situations, it won’t always or even usually hold for lawyers. Lawyers, in this instance,
should be left less at risk of liability than doctors.”).
167 For simplicity’s sake here, assume full information such that we might imagine
that the parties would settle a case at or around roughly its expected litigation value, if
we assume away things like transaction costs, mismatching valuations, the prospect of
value creation, differences in risk preferences, and a number of other real-world features
of settlement.
168 In Scenario 1, before the lawyer’s malpractice, the plaintiff’s LV was ($1 million * 0.7) = $700,000. Following the malpractice, the LV of the case was ($1 million * 0.4)
= $400,000. In Scenario 2, before the lawyer’s malpractice, the plaintiff’s LV was ($1 million * 0.4) = $400,000. Following the malpractice, the LV of the case was ($1 million * 0.1)
= $100,000. In both cases, the effect was a $300,000 decrease in the LV of the case.
169 The plaintiff, at the moment before the lawyer’s malpractice, in our hypothetical
and simplified universe, faced a choice between a certain settlement and the value of taking the case to trial—a bundle of legal endowments, the best valuation of which is captured
by the LV figure.
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When the attorney misconduct concerns settlement, rather
than litigation, the same principles apply, but their application is
more complex. For purposes of simple illustration, I focus here on
the circumstance in which an attorney provides her client with
actionably poor advice about the client’s prospects in litigation.170
As above, incorporating probabilities and settlement dampens the
lottery-winner effects of the all-or-nothing case-within-a-case approach built into the current malpractice system.
Assume for purposes of Scenarios 3 and 4 a lawsuit in which
the lawyer’s client, the plaintiff, stands to net $1 million if he
wins, and $0 if he loses. Assume no transaction costs, and assume
further that the defendant has offered to settle the case for
$500,000.
c) Scenario 3. The lawyer informs the plaintiff that his
odds of winning at trial are 60 percent. Based on this advice, the
plaintiff client rejects the defendant’s settlement offer. In fact, the
lawyer’s assessment was wrong, and the plaintiff actually had a
30 percent chance of winning at trial. The client loses this lawsuit
70 percent of the time, and we will assume that he brings a malpractice action against his attorney. Under the current system’s
approach, the client would testify (presumably credibly) that he
“would have” accepted the defendant’s offer if he had been
properly advised about his BATNA. Comparing that but-for world
with the world that actually occurred, in which the plaintiff lost
the case, the current system would award the plaintiff the difference—namely, the full amount of the defendant’s offer: $500,000.
d) Scenario 4. The lawyer informs the plaintiff that his
odds of winning at trial are 30 percent. Based on this advice, the
plaintiff accepts the defendant’s settlement offer. In fact, the lawyer’s assessment was wrong, and the plaintiff actually had a 60
percent chance of winning at trial. Under the current system, if
the plaintiff is able to identify this error, he will (presumably
credibly) testify that he would have rejected the defendant’s offer
if he had been properly advised by his attorney. The case-withina-case approach would then say that in the but-for world the
plaintiff “would have” won the underlying case, receiving $1 million. The difference between that but-for outcome and the actual
outcome (the plaintiff already holds $500,000 from the settlement) is another $500,000.

170 The question is more complex with respect to circumstances in which the lawyer’s
misconduct related to the valuation of a settlement option or some kind of across-the-table
settlement malpractice.
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What makes more sense—and is more aligned with the realities of modern litigation—would be to put the plaintiff in the
same position he would have been in before the lawyer delivered
her substandard advice. The injury to the plaintiff is the difference
between the actual result the plaintiff obtained and the value of
the choice the plaintiff would have made, if properly advised.
In Scenario 3, the plaintiff’s actual choice at the moment before the lawyer’s misconduct was between a $500,000 settlement
and going to trial, the LV of which was $300,000. The client would
have presumably accepted the settlement. This outcome should
then be compared with the value of the endowment the client actually held after his decision based on his lawyer’s faulty advice.
In this case, the client still held the value of bringing the case to
trial—a LV of $300,000. Before knowing what the result of the
trial would be, the plaintiff would have presumably been indifferent between going to trial and settling (or selling the right to go
to trial) for $300,000.171 So, the true injury to the client is the difference between what the client could have had ($500,000) and
what he was actually left with ($300,000)—namely $200,000.172
In Scenario 4, the same logic produces a similarly dampened
result. The client believed that his choice was between (1) settling
for $500,000 and (2) proceeding to trial—an endowment he believed worth $300,000. He chose to settle for $500,000. But his
actual choice was between settling for $500,000 and proceeding
to trial, which had an expected value of $600,000. If the system
provides him with the difference between those two values—in
other words, $100,000—he will be in the same position he would
have been in before the lawyer’s misconduct.
Two immediate challenges arise about the prospect of this
kind of assessment. The first is that in the real world, it can be
difficult to assess with precision both the payout and the probabilities associated with future litigation.173 Each participant in a
171 This is a simplifying assumption for purposes of illustration. In the real world, the
economics would be more complex, and the plaintiff would undoubtedly have a number of
interests not captured by this simple way of formulating the choice. Still, the concept that
there would be some point of indifference—some offer one could make to the client that
would render him indifferent between accepting the offer and proceeding to trial. For purposes of this illustration, I am treating that number as the case’s LV.
172 This has the merits of preventing the lawyer from serving, inappropriately, as the
guarantor of the case. Otherwise, the plaintiff receives all of the upside risk of proceeding
to trial (where he may win outright) and it is the lawyer who bears the downside risk
(because he will have to compensate the plaintiff as though the risk of taking the case to
trial had paid off).
173 See Kiser, Beyond Right and Wrong at 23 (cited in note 70) (noting a great disparity in predictions for damages awards).
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piece of litigation has access to different information, different experiences coloring their interpretation of that information, different incentives, and different potential cognitive biases that are
likely to cause the exercise to lack scientific precision. Still, clients
and attorneys are called upon to make probabilistic assessments,
based on imperfect information about expected payouts, every
day. To ignore the prominence of those decisions is to ignore a
fundamental aspect of modern litigation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, in an Article broadly
aimed at urging greater accountability for lawyers regarding
their conduct in settlement contexts, it may seem odd to urge a
system in which some injured plaintiffs, in some contexts, would
receive less in damages than the current system provides. But the
system adjusted for probabilities and settlements does not always
produce a smaller recovery for plaintiffs. Furthermore, I might
hope that if the malpractice system had fewer lottery-ticket attributes, we might see greater willingness from the courts to examine honestly the full range of impacts from lawyers’ conduct.
The conundrum of the current system is the manner in which it
treats decisions and outcomes as binary, all-or-nothing. The reality is that litigation involves probabilities and the prospect of settlement, and by incorporating those factors into the system, we
better compensate (without overcompensating arbitrarily, or failing to compensate at all) those clients who are injured by their
lawyers’ actions.
2. Accounting for value creation.
A case’s litigation value and its settlement value are too often
conflated. In some respects, calculating the value associated with
a case and its resolution may be relatively straightforward: a
case’s settlement value equals the litigation value of a case, plus
or minus the anticipated risk-adjusted transaction costs associated with continued litigation.174 This is familiar, indeed foundational, to much of the classic economic analysis of the settlement

174 See, for example, Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 401–
11 (Belknap 2004); J.J. Prescott and Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil
Settlement, 91 NYU L Rev 59, 71–72 (2016). The prospect also exists that settlement results from (or is prevented by) agency costs—mismatches between the attorney’s incentives and the client’s incentives. See, for example, Kathryn E. Spier and Bruce L. Hay, The
Positive Theory of Litigation and Settlement in Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 442 (Stockton Press 1998) (describing the effects of fee
arrangements, interests regarding publicity, timing, and control).
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of litigated cases.175 Transaction costs, fully understood, include
both direct, easily quantifiable transaction costs such as attorneys’ fees and less direct opportunity costs such as the time and
attention litigation consumes, depriving people of the ability to
otherwise be engaged in productive activities. Even before adding
in the possibility that disputants will have mismatching predictions about likely litigation outcomes,176 the simple prospect of
avoiding transaction costs makes settlement Pareto dominant
over litigation in many conditions.177 But in practice, assessing a
case’s settlement value includes more factors than this. Indeed,
the negotiation literature describes a range of ways in which a
client’s valuation of both litigation and settlement extend beyond
a simple economic calculation of expected net trial outcomes—
even in contexts in which the client is acting wholly rationally.178
Broadly speaking, settlements often produce non-zero-sum outcomes or “value” for the parties that represents a greater total
utility than litigation could have produced.179
There is some evidence to suggest that people are not universally good at creating value in negotiation contexts.180 But the fact

175 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 417–20 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 55, 63 (1982); Spier and Hay, Settlement of Litigation at
442 (cited in note 174).
176 There is considerable evidence that litigants develop mismatching predictions
about their prospects at trial. See, for example, Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 277–78 (NorthHolland 2004) (surveying the economic literature on the effects of “[m]utual optimism,” a
condition in which parties hold inconsistent views about likely trial outcomes) (emphasis
in original). See generally, Spier and Hay, The Positive Theory at 443 (cited in note 174)
(“The existence of divergent party expectations concerning trial remains the most influential account of why cases may fail to settle.”).
177 See Spier, Litigation at 269 (cited in note 176).
178 The literature also includes a vast array of instances in which deviations from one
vision of “rationality” are described as “errors” or “mistakes.” For a thoughtful critique of
this characterization, see generally Katheryn Zeiler, Mistaken about Mistakes, 48 Eur L
& Econ 9 (2019).
179 For more on sources of settlement value, see David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius,
The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain 88–112 (NY
Free Press 1986); Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning at 225–26 (cited in
note 4); Leigh L. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 76–87 (Pearson 2012).
See also McDermott, Inc v AmClyde, 511 US 202, 215 (1994) (“The parties’ desire to avoid
litigation costs, to reduce uncertainty, and to maintain ongoing commercial relationships
is sufficient to ensure nontrial dispositions in the vast majority of cases.”).
180 See, for example, Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator at 74 (cited in
note 179) (“Most untrained negotiators view negotiation as a pie-slicing task: They assume
that their interests are incompatible, that impasse is likely, and that issues are settled
one by one rather than as packages.”); Kathleen M. O’Connor and Ann A. Adams, What
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that some people negotiate in ways that create suboptimal outcomes does not mean that we should expect or condone such behavior—particularly among those for whom this forms a significant part of their professional practice. There are at least some
examples of courts holding that attorneys have a professional obligation to help their clients to capture some of these kinds of
value-creating deals. For example, a settlement’s structure or
timing may have profound, but different, tax consequences for the
parties, raising the prospect of efficient trades.181 Lawyers for litigants locked in an intellectual property dispute might help clients to structure a forward-looking business arrangement involving licenses and royalties as a means of capitalizing on non-zerosum opportunities between the disputing parties.182 Counsel may
(correctly) anticipate the prospect of future disputes arising during the implementation of complex settlement terms and may
build in predetermined dispute resolution processes to minimize
the transaction costs associated with those implementation problems. The settling parties may be able to take advantage of economies of scale, permitting the defendant to provide some benefit
to the plaintiff at a lower cost than the plaintiff would need to
bear on his own.183 Or the parties may have nonmonetary or nonquantifiable interests such as protecting their reputations.184
Novices Think about Negotiation: A Content Analysis of Scripts, 15 Negotiation J 135, 142
(1999) (“[N]ovices tend to assume that negotiator interests are incompatible.”).
181 See, for example, French v Domnarski, 1995 WL 573787, *1 (Conn Super) (describing a client who settled a claim, relying on an attorney’s mistaken advice that alimony and
certain mortgage payments would be tax deductible); Jalali v Root, 109 Cal App 4th 1768,
1775 (2003) (explaining that a client relied on an attorney’s allegedly erroneous advice
about the tax consequences of payments when deciding to settle sexual harassment claim).
182 For an example, see Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning at 240–47
(cited in note 4) (describing a deal between Digital and Intel resolving a patent dispute
through the use of a series of business transactions).
183 See, for example, Draper v Brennan, 713 A2d 373, 374 (NH 1998) (defendant in
employment dispute agreed to keep former employee plaintiff on company insurance program until he reached age sixty-five, but plaintiff’s attorney failed to secure protection
against the company later charging plaintiff for these benefits).
184 See, for example, Steinberg v Grasso, 2007 WL 701689, *2 (NJ Super) (describing
a lawyer who incorrectly advised a client that a proposed agreement contained a high-low
partial agreement that would shield the client from having to report a claim to the national
practitioner data bank). But see Zalta v Billips, 81 Cal App 3d 183, 188 (1978) (describing
plaintiffs’ claim that their lawyer failed to correct a mistaken summary of a settlement,
causing them reputational damage when the misreported settlement suggested that the
plaintiffs were admitting medical malpractice); Barella v Exchange Bank, 84 Cal App 4th
793, 801 (2000) (“[T]he value to a particular plaintiff of public vindication (or, conversely,
the negative value of confidentiality) is so highly subjective and elusive that no court can
determine its monetary worth.”). This tendency of courts to conflate parties’ interests with
the legal remedies articulated in pleadings is widespread but troublesome. See Moffitt, 80
Ind L Rev at 744–45 (cited in note 10). We know, however, that real-world clients “may
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In addition to the prospect of value creation, almost every settlement negotiation will also present distributive questions (such
as how much money will exchange hands between the parties).185
A lawyer’s negotiation missteps may also harm her client in this
aspect of the negotiations. Consider, for example, the case underlying Bonifer v Kullmann Klein & Dionenda.186 Faced with a personal injury claim by an injured shopper, Wal-Mart conveyed an
offer of $35,000 to the plaintiff’s attorney, and the attorney indicated that the plaintiff would accept the deal. The plaintiff subsequently expressed frustration with Wal-Mart’s offer and even
tried to argue that the attorney had no authority to signal acceptance. But when the plaintiff pressed for more from Wal-Mart,
Wal-Mart refused. The plaintiff suspected the attorney’s disclosure of privileged information in negotiations had undermined
the settlement efforts.187 Because offers of compromise are generally inadmissible at trial,188 an attorney’s actions in a case like
Bonifer would have had no impact on the case’s litigation value.
Even in the context of a case that was purely zero-sum, however,
it is reasonable to assume that an unauthorized189 disclosure such
as this would have a negative impact on the case’s settlement
value.
What would it look like for a malpractice system to recognize
that settlements are often non-zero-sum and that a case’s settlement value is a function of (but not identical to) its litigation

seek compensation, vengeance, fair and dignified treatment, apologies, reform, and an array of other goals in their legal interactions.” Robbennolt and Sternlight, Psychology for
Lawyers at 258 (cited in note 39).
185 See, for example, Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning at 27–43 (cited
in note 4); Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator at 40–68 (cited in note 179).
186 457 SW3d 765 (Mo App 2014).
187 Id at 767. In the legal malpractice suit that followed, the court rejected as “speculative” the plaintiffs’ assertion that this conduct prejudiced them in subsequent negotiations with Wal-Mart. Id at 769.
188 See, for example, FRE 408; Eisenmann v Podhorn, 528 SW3d 22 (Mo App 2017)
(“Evidence of settlement offers or agreements is generally inadmissible because public policy favors the settlement of disputes, and because offers of settlement ‘lend an aura of guilt
and/or liability to the offering party.’”), citing Ullrich v CADCO, Inc, 244 SW3d 772, 780
(Mo App 2008).
189 One’s reservation value is typically a function of one’s BATNA, and there are contexts in which revealing one’s BATNA may yield strategic benefit. In simplistic terms, if I
believe your walkaway alternative is lousy, I may have insufficient incentive to put something attractive on the table in our negotiations. You may, therefore, perceive the need to
share your perception of your BATNA with me, in hopes that I will be persuaded that you
will walk away if I am not more generous. Whether one ought to disclose a reservation
value is a more debatable proposition. The easiest case of settlement malpractice, therefore, is one in which the disclosure was unauthorized and accidental, rather than a function of an intentional negotiation strategy.
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value? At a minimum, clients would be able to recover damages
beyond those narrowly falling within the remedial powers of the
court. The case-within-a-case analysis may serve properly to unearth and quantify the impacts of lawyers’ litigation decisions.
But in a non-zero-sum world, clients’ recovery should not be limited to that which a court might have done. Rather it should be a
function of the utility the client would have received from the now
foregone settlement.190
3. Accounting for client choice.
In civil litigation—or in a civil malpractice action stemming
from that litigation—does client choice itself currently have a legally cognizable value,191 separate from injury to the litigation
value or settlement value of a case? Under the current jurisprudence of legal malpractice, the answer is plainly no. For example,
in Moores v Greenberg,192 Moores hired a contingent fee attorney
to help him bring a claim for injuries he sustained on the job.193
His attorney received a $90,000 settlement offer from the defendants, but never communicated the offer to Moores, later saying,
“the sums mentioned to him were too niggardly to be relayed.”194
The case went to trial, and the jury found for the defendant.
Moores later asserted that “he would have accepted the $90,000
offer had he been informed of it.”195 To what damages should
Moores have been entitled, if he could prove the other elements of
his malpractice claim? The court held that the attorney, “by failing to communicate the offer . . . effectively deprive[d] his client
of the net benefit of the tendered bargain—nothing more.”196 Even
if he were to succeed with all of his claims, therefore, Moores could
receive at most $60,000—the amount Moores would have netted
from such a settlement, once reduced by the lawyer’s contingent
190 Note that this may require courts to reduce noneconomic interests into economic
terms, given their remedial limitations. This is awkward, to be certain, but it must still be
better than simply assuming those real-world interests away. See Moffitt, 80 Ind L J at
744–47 (cited in note 10) (describing ways in which pleadings provide inadequate articulations of clients’ true interests).
191 The Supreme Court has recognized, in at least limited criminal contexts, the constitutional importance of client choice. See, for example, McCoy v Louisiana, 138 S Ct
1500, 1507 (2018) (explaining that a defendant’s choices in exercising the right to defend
rather than plead guilty must be respected). But this recognition has not extended to include a calculable measure of damages.
192 834 F2d 1105 (1st Cir 1987).
193 Id at 1106.
194 Id at 1107–08.
195 Id at 1107.
196 Moores, 834 F2d at 1110.
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fees. The First Circuit spent considerable time detailing, and ultimately rejecting, Moores’s argument that his award in a legal
malpractice case should not be reduced by the fees he allegedly
owed to the very attorney who committed malpractice.197 But nowhere did the court appear even to consider the possibility that
the lawyer’s action, by depriving Moores of the ability to make a
choice, had caused some separate injury.
The law is not otherwise ambiguous on the abstract question
of whether lawyers should help (rather than hinder) their clients’
ability to choose. “[T]he objectives of representation” are specifically the province of the client, according to virtually every articulation of legal ethics,198 and lawyers are expected to “explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”199 Courts
have recognized, as a matter of agency, the importance of assuring that clients retain the ability to make independent choices
about settlement.200 And courts have refused to enforce provisions
in contingent fee arrangements that would encroach on a client’s
ability to exercise choice.201 What courts have not done is move
beyond a damages calculation that compares (1) the substance of
the outcome in which the client had no adequate choice with
(2) the substance of the outcome that would have resulted from
the client exercising choice. In other words, courts provide little
support in practice for the notion that a lawyer who deprives her
client of the ability to make a choice creates an injury independently worthy of remedy.202 This result is inconsistent with the
197

Id at 1109–13.
Model Rules, Rule 1.2(a).
199 Model Rules, Rule 1.4(b).
200 See, for example, Commissioner v Banks, 543 US 426, 436 (2005); Ex parte Free,
910 S2d 753, 755, 757 (Ala 2005) (reversing a trial court’s dismissal of a claim in which
the plaintiff alleged that her attorney presented the disabled plaintiff “with merely 4 signature pages, simply advising her to sign them because ‘the Judge is in a hurry and there
isn’t enough time for me to read them to you’”).
201 See, for example, In re Plaza, 363 Bankr 517, 520, 522 (Bankr SD Tex 2007) (refusing to enforce a provision providing that the “client will not make settlement . . . or
accept any sum as reimbursement for any of the client’s injuries or expenses, without the
attorney’s consent,” on the grounds that it “appears to be directly at odds with the well
accepted principle that it is the client who has exclusive control over whether to settle,
compromise or adjust the cause of action”).
202 I have no easy answer to the question of what value to assign to client choice, in
which the existing framework provides for ready comparative calculation resulting in an
award. Perhaps in some contexts the deal should be more readily voidable than might
otherwise be permitted under the existing system. Perhaps the lawyer should become the
guarantor of the uncommunicated settlement offer. Perhaps some part of the lawyer’s fees
should be forfeit as an imperfect proxy for the value the client attaches to choice. Or perhaps, the “loss of chance” doctrine should apply in the legal malpractice context.
198
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modern reality of settlement—a condition in which clients routinely ask lawyers to help them make good settlement decisions
(but not to strip them of those decisions).
D. Lawyer-as-Negotiator: Beyond Indeterminacy
As I described above in Part II.A, lawyers’ settlement decisions are often treated with almost complete judgmental deference. And in Part III.A, I argued that at least many of the decisions lawyers make with respect to settlement counseling (the
behind-the-table aspect of settlement negotiations) do not merit
this level of deference. I left aside the harder question of whether
there are across-the-table settlement negotiation actions a lawyer
may take that would be subject to less sweepingly deferential
scrutiny. Might attorneys-as-negotiators ever face greater scrutiny than they do today?
Negotiation’s strategically interactive nature creates limits
on the degree to which we can effectively assess behavior. A professional system might employ ethical or other constraints to create boundaries around a negotiator’s acceptable behavior. But so
long as multiple choices are available, and no equilibrium or payoff structure exists to make one of the choices demonstrably
worse, then no negotiator’s decision can be subject to ex post critique as irrational or substandard. Whether a particular move
was “right” depends on what the other side did, which in turn depends on what they thought you would do. Negotiations between
human beings, therefore, will never lend themselves to a formulaic, paint-by-number approach in which specific moves are always prescribed.
But it does not follow from this that there is no hope for improvement or for articulating standards below which competent
professionals must not fall. Indeed, just because we cannot perhaps name an ideal approach to negotiation does not mean that
one cannot identify practices that fall below the level of professional competence. In this Section, I name several reasons I am
hopeful that the landscape will change in directions that will provide higher quality settlement-related services for clients.
1. Potential lessons from specialized civil practice.
Most of the analysis in this Article has focused on the rules
and standards applicable to all lawyers, in all civil settlement contexts. These are not the only standards governing lawyers, however. Some of the specialized practice areas—along with practice-
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specific standards—have developed in response to settlement pressures. From one or more of these specialized areas of practice, we
may find models of possible futures for the broader legal profession.
For example, some sophisticated parties have begun to employ settlement counsel—lawyers who take on a role parallel and
complimentary to, but separate from, the role played by the client’s litigators.203 By insulating themselves from some of the duties associated with traditional litigation, settlement counsel are
charged with helping clients to overcome some of the most persistent barriers to the efficient resolution of disputes.204 And settlement counsel may dampen some of the challenges of the information asymmetries and mismatching incentives that mark the
litigator-client relationship. Settlement counsel at least provide
their clients with an internal marketplace of ideas. They are still
subject to the potential for principal-agent tensions, of course.
Just as a litigator may provide skewed advice, so may settlement
counsel. But the client will be in at least a better position to choose
from among two different suggested diagnoses and prescriptions.
A second example of the legal landscape changing to alter the
underlying incentive and information problems associated with
traditional litigation can be found in the rise of collaborative lawyers.205 Unlike settlement counsel, which can be (and often is) unilateral, collaborative law contemplates practitioners on each side
of a case. Similar to settlement counsel in that they restrict the
scope of their services ex ante, each collaborative lawyer binds
herself to represent her clients for purposes of settlement, but
203 See, for example, William F. Coyne Jr, The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 Ohio
St J Disp Resol 367, 392 (1999); James McGuire, Why Litigators Should Use Settlement
Counsel, 18 Alternatives to High Cost of Litig 119, 120 (2000). See also generally Kathy
A. Bryan, Why Should Businesses Hire Settlement Counsel?, 2008 J Disp Resol 195.
204 Coyne, 14 Ohio St J Disp Resol at 369 (cited in note 203):

[T]here are significant incentives for lawyers not to embrace early settlement.
These incentives include the need to market services, the desire not to appear
weak, the obligation to represent a client zealously, the thirst for justice, and
last, but perhaps not least, the desire to maximize income. In addition, it is extremely difficult, psychologically, for an attorney to act as an effective advocate
and, at the same time, to encourage settlement.
205 See generally Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in
Divorce without Litigation (ABA 2001); William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A
Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 Pepperdine Disp Resol L J 351 (2004). For a foreshadowing of the Collaborative Law experiment, see Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum L Rev 509, 513, 522–34 (1994) (“[L]awyers are repeat players who have the
opportunity to establish reputations. At the core of our story is the potential for disputing
parties to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma inherent in much litigation by selecting cooperative lawyers whose reputations credibly commit each party to a cooperative strategy.”).
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precommits not to represent her client in litigation, if settlement
talks fail to resolve the dispute.206 Through limited retention
agreements or limited scope agreements, these lawyers and their
clients create a condition in which they mutually signal not only
a willingness, but also a certain level of eagerness, to bargain collaboratively in order to avoid litigation.207 Furthermore, because
of the structure of the disqualification provisions, clients and
agents share this interest in early resolution.208 Important questions remain about the juxtaposition of these contractual arrangements and lawyers’ overarching ethical duties. But a client who
seeks to retain the services of a collaborative lawyer removes at
least the prospect that a self-interested lawyer will prescribe protracted litigation, for example.209
I would predict that settlement malpractice claims against
either settlement counsel or collaborative lawyers may (either today or at some point in the foreseeable future) be comparatively
easier than similar claims against lawyers in general practice.210
Of course, nothing in collaborative lawyers’ limited representation agreements or in settlement counsel’s professional posture
could dislodge foundational tort principles such as the duty to exercise ordinary care in delivering those services. But the idea is
that each of these practitioners holds herself out to do something
differently than other practitioners. Might an unhappy client find
in the limited agreements or in the broader representations about
the promise of collaborative law a hook upon which to hang a
breach of duty claim that might go unrecognized among the
broader population of lawyers? Might an examination of collaborative lawyers’ practices reveal that a particular set of behaviors
(for example, certain uncollaborative behaviors) might fall demonstrably outside of the relevant community’s standard practices, such that negligence might be established? Might a client
(appropriately) find it easier to criticize the settlement-related
advice or conduct of an attorney acting as settlement counsel,
206

See Schwab, 4 Pepperdine Disp Resol L J at 358–60 (cited in note 205).
For more on the signaling aspects of collaborative law, see Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and
the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 Iowa L Rev 475, 481–97 (2005).
208 See Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J Disp Resol 131, 133.
209 Collaborative law still presents the risk of self-dealing if, in order to continue to
amass hourly fees, the lawyer recommends continued negotiations.
210 Most insurers have reported significantly lower risk premiums for lawyers who
work in practice areas in which mediation and negotiation are prominent. See Tom Baker
and Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as a Window on Lawyers’ Professional Liability,
5 UC Irvine L Rev 1273, 1291 n 60 (2015). It would be interesting to see if any differentiation emerges in the marketplace for insurance.
207
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given that she was specifically hired for the sole purpose of advising and assisting with settlement? Furthermore, because the
community of lawyers providing these services is still comparatively small, one might find greater consistency in the kinds of
negotiation practices—the kind of consistency one would need in
order to demonstrate that a particular practice falls outside of the
scope of “ordinary care.” Finally, because these models of practice
are specific, rather than general, we might expect to see a change
to some of the ethical models governing these practices. The challenge of articulating a standard of care—or a governing ethic—
becomes easier in a more constrained and specific practice.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that either collaborative lawyers or settlement counsel are engaged in more malpractice than
the general lawyer in a settlement context. Indeed, the collaborative law movement can legitimately claim important successes,
and the settlement counsel I have observed have been deeply conscientious and thoughtful practitioners. Instead, my point is that
clients of such lawyers might have an easier time establishing
that a particular set of attorney actions demonstrably constitute
a breach of that kind of lawyer’s duties, even if that same action
would be unobjectionable among the broader population of attorneys. The fact of specialization may give rise to a more defined
standard of care, thus creating a greater prospect of accountability through a malpractice system.
2. Potential lessons from criminal practice.
Plea negotiations between prosecutors and defense attorneys
are in many ways the criminal analogs to civil settlement negotiations. There are, of course, structural, legal, and ethical differences between criminal and civil settlements.211 Particularly
when viewed from the perspective of the criminal defendant, however, the similarities between the landscape of practice expectations in plea negotiations and civil settlements overwhelm the differences. Criminal defendants rely on their attorneys for
competent advice about their litigation prospects and the implications of any potential plea agreement. And criminal defendants
rely on attorneys to engage in most, if not all, of the negotiation
dance on their behalf. Each of these aspects of the criminal plea
bargaining process has a direct analog in civil settlement, and as

211 For a useful overview, see generally Susan M. Treyz, Criminal Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff, 59 Fordham L Rev 719 (1991).
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I have explained above, each raises the prospect of substandard
services by an attorney.
One potentially significant difference, however, is the fact
that criminal clients enjoy a constitutional guarantee of effective
representation.212 Most of the early cases testing the scope and
nature of these rights focused on criminal attorneys’ litigation
conduct, but the last decade has seen the Supreme Court also consider the centrality of lawyers’ roles in the plea bargaining process through the lens of the constitutional protection against the
ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, in Padilla v
Kentucky,213 Jose Padilla, charged with marijuana trafficking,214
received “patently incorrect advice” from his attorney that he accept a plea deal on the grounds that he “did not have to worry
about immigration status since he had been in the country so
long.”215 In fact, Padilla’s plea made deportation “virtually mandatory.”216 Similarly, in Frye, Galin Frye’s attorney received a plea
offer in writing but never communicated the offer to Frye.217 The
offer expired, the case went to trial, and Frye was convicted.218 As
a final example, in Lafler v Cooper,219 Anthony Cooper was
charged with assault with intent to murder.220 He had expressed
a willingness to accept a plea agreement initially, but his lawyer
(erroneously) informed him that “the prosecution would be unable
to establish his intent to murder [the victim] because she had
been shot below the waist.”221 Each of these forms of misconduct
has direct analogies to the civil settlement misconduct described
earlier in this Article. In each of these cases, however, the Supreme

212 See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 351 (1963) (recognizing the right to counsel
for offenses carrying the possibility of substantial prison sentences); McMann v Richardson,
397 US 759, 771 n 14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”); Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687
(1984) (establishing the relevant two-part standard for determining whether representation was ineffective).
213 559 US 356 (2015).
214 Id at 359.
215 Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 Yale L J 2650, 2657 (2013).
Note the parallels with Ordon. See Part III.A.
216 Padilla, 559 US at 359.
217 Frye, 556 US at 39.
218 Id at 138–39. Note the parallels with Moores. See Part III.C.3.
219 566 US 156 (2012).
220 Id at 161.
221 Id. Note the parallels with Sauer. See Part III.A.
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Court held that the defendant’s attorney had provided legal services sufficiently substandard to constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.222
Criminal cases raise many of the same questions and challenges for unhappy clients as do their civil counterparts. How
does one establish that the lawyer’s error had an actual, adverse
impact on the defense?223 How does one establish that the lawyer’s
conduct was, in fact, an error?224 How does one overcome the lack
of visibility into (or paper trails documenting) the attorney’s advice or negotiation conduct?225 What, if any, impact should a
judge’s involvement in the plea bargaining or plea receiving process have on subsequent claims?226 I do not presume that the answers to these questions in the criminal context will be easier
than in the civil context—except that the existence of a constitutional protection combined with the near ubiquity of plea agreements will mean that courts are likely to be faced with such
claims comparatively more frequently. If nothing else, this volume may, through the usual common law process, stimulate the
development of clearer standards about how we judge the conduct
of lawyers in a settlement context.227

222 Padilla, 559 US at 374; Frye, 566 US at 151 (remanding to consider state law issues relevant for the second prong under Strickland); Lafler, 566 US at 174.
223 Strickland, 466 US at 687. See also Part II.B.
224 As the Court in Frye wrote:

“The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it
presents questions farther removed from immediate judicial supervision.” . . .
Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal style.
The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may
be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process.
Frye, 566 US at 144–45, quoting Premo v Moore, 562 US 115, 125 (2011). See also
Part II.A.
225 See Roberts, 122 Yale L J at 2671–72 (cited in note 215). See also Part III.B.
226 See, for example, Rishi Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution Perspective, 76 Ohio St L J 565, 589–90 (2015); Nancy J. King and Ronald
F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial
Participation in Negotiations, 95 Tex L Rev 325, 347–56 (2016). For an illustration of the
limits and potential complications of judicial involvement—even in the sense of a judicial
colloquy—on the prospects of a subsequent malpractice claim, see Puder v Buechel, 874
A2d 534, 538 (NJ 2005) (evaluating whether continued prosecution of a legal malpractice
claim would violate principles of judicial estoppel due to plaintiff’s representations to the
court that the prosecuted claims were moot).
227 The common law arrow may also sometimes flow the other direction—that is, that
developments in the realm of civil settlement malpractice may inform courts’ treatment of
alleged plea negotiation malpractice.
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3. Research prospects.
Settlement negotiations have been the subject of serious
scholarly research for only a few generations at most—the blink
of an academic eye.228 Some of the indeterminacy associated with
negotiation decisions is surely a function of negotiation’s strategic
interactivity. But I suggest that we are also on a collective learning curve about negotiation effectiveness. Two different factors
will likely drive the next generation of negotiation research: the
emergence of big data and a shift away from the search for optimal strategies.
Big data—the collection and analysis of mass volumes of information in ways that were unthinkable a generation ago—has
changed countless aspects of modern life,229 and I expect that we
will see its effects on our understanding of negotiation as well.
What if researchers (or litigants) were able to access broad data
about the terms of settlements across jurisdictions and contexts?
We have already seen, in the context of certain kinds of personal
injury cases, the effects of aggregated data. Big data could offer
similar bounding valuation guidance for other types of claims—
including those involving settlement.230 Or what if researchers
had access to broad data about the process by which settlements
were reached? Such information would have the potential to
change (or confirm and solidify) our understanding of ordinary
(and by extension, extraordinary or outlier) negotiation practices.
Having access to the complete record of the flow of offers and
other information back and forth in a single negotiation has the

228 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founders of ADR, 16 Ohio St J Disp Resol 1, 1–5 (2000) (providing historical perspective
on the field’s development).
229 Online dating services, policing focused on crime “hot spots,” calculating routes for
delivery drivers, and the “Moneyball” approach to managing a professional sports team
are conspicuous examples. Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data (NY Times, Feb 11, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/W6HN-ZBC5. See also Taha Yasseri, How Big Data Will
Change Our Lives and Our Understanding of Them (Dataconomy, May 16, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/ZSC8-XEB3.
230 Such valuation guidance would be feasible only with access to greater information
about settlements and their terms. We have seen movements toward making at least some
kinds of settlements more public. For example, the “Harvey Weinstein tax reform” now
provides a disincentive for confidentiality and nondisclosure clauses in certain kinds of
settlements. See 26 USC § 162(q). Similarly, some state laws refuse to enforce, on public
policy grounds, confidentiality clauses in settlements affecting public health. See, for example, Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004 Mich
St L Rev 237; Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping Settlements Secret, 37 Fla St U L Rev 945 (2010);
Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and
Sexual Assault Cases, 103 Cornell L Rev 311 (2018).
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potential to yield interesting insights.231 Still, even if the record
from a negotiation were complete, data about a single negotiation
would not permit the kind of social science to which we might aspire. But what if we had access to that information across multiple years, across thousands of litigated cases, across multiple jurisdictions? What if we had a database of searchable, codable,
comparable information about the real-world settlement behaviors (including documents exchanged, information requests, instances of inquiry or advocacy, offers, counteroffers, timelines,
and outcomes, for example), and we had that information for
thousands, or tens of thousands, or millions232 of parties and their
lawyers? Armed with such information, researchers might discover a great deal about how negotiation works in practice. And
unhappy parties might discover that their lawyers’ conduct was
(or was not) outside of the norm of practice.233
I predict that we will, along with the availability of additional
data, see new directions in research. Much of the negotiation research to date has focused largely on the meta question, “What
works best?” This research impulse is understandable, and the
prescriptive advice stemming from that research is a real improvement over anything that existed even two generations ago.
Yet, if theorists are correct, and negotiation almost always presents both opportunities for joint gains and distributive issues to
resolve, articulable and absolute prescriptions are almost impossible to construct. “Always make the first offer” is no more defensible as a universal prescription than is “Never make the first offer.” Even if one or the other of those pieces of advice were
somehow demonstrably true, presumably both sides would know

231 But see Scott R. Peppet and Michael L. Moffitt, Learning How to Learn to Negotiate in Chris Honeyman and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, eds, The Negotiator’s Desk Reference 13 (DRI 2017) (describing concrete data, such as that available in a transcript, as
critical to action-science-based learning).
232 The meteoric rise of online dispute resolution makes access to data at this scale a
distinct possibility. See, for example, Elayne E. Greenberg and Noam Ebner, What Dinosaurs Can Teach Lawyers about How to Avoid Extinction in the ODR Evolution *10–11
(St. John’s School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Jan 17, 2019), archived at
http://perma.cc/RB77-YGF8; Scott J. Shackleford and Anjanette H. Raymond, Building
the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014 Wis L Rev 615, 622. See also generally Ethan Katsch and
Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know about Online Dispute Resolution, 67 SC L
Rev 329 (2016).
233 The dearth of information about lawyers’ conduct in negotiations is emblematic of
the lack of information about lawyers’ conduct more generally. See Randall Kiser, Beyond
Right and Wrong at 11 (cited in note 70) (describing what he calls “The Paradox of Copious
Lawyers and Scant Data”).
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it to be true, resulting in a tragicomic negotiation stalemate. Particularly with respect to any zero-sum aspect of negotiation, any
advice that benefits one side will necessarily come at the expense
of the other. And so, both will presumably wind up following the
same negotiation advice, rendering its demonstrable effectiveness
more questionable.
Even if it is true that it is challenging to articulate universally effective negotiation practices, however, it does not necessarily follow that one could not articulate ineffective negotiation
practices. What if researchers—with the benefit of larger datasets—flipped the question modestly? Might there be answers,
at least, to the question, “What behaviors tend to work least well
in negotiations?” I am unconvinced that we could not identify
things that effective negotiators don’t do.234 Perhaps caveats
would be necessary. Perhaps even those things we identified
would not produce poor results in 100 percent of cases. But even
if the results of such an inquiry were merely to identify practices
with reliably net expected losses, when compared to some baseline, that would be of great interest. Admittedly, this line of research would likely disappoint busy practitioners looking for advice about what to do next. The market for a popular book
entitled, “How Not to Negotiate” would likely be modest. But such
a set of research would help to move us beyond the indeterminate
vision of negotiation—one in which anything goes. It would instead present a world in which, even if there remains a wide range
of different approaches, certain things would fall below the level
of “ordinary care,” and from a malpractice perspective, this is all
that would be required. Professors Gillian Hadfield and Deborah
Rhode have described “validated prescriptive regulations,” based
on information exactly like this, as being superior to much of tort
law’s current reliance on predictive, performance-based regulation.235 I am fundamentally optimistic that the next generation
will know more than us about how disputes are (and are not) resolved effectively.

234 With apologies to every English teacher I have ever known, I acknowledge that
single sentence exceeds the number of negatives typically permitted in an entire paragraph. Perhaps there would be a way to word this sentence differently, but I think it is
important to highlight the difference in prospects between looking for what is effective and
looking for what might be ineffective.
235 Hadfield and Rhode, 67 Hastings L J at 1201 (emphasis in original) (cited in
note 38).
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4. Education as catalyst.
Because tort law compares the actions of a professional with
the usual actions of her relevant peer group, the mere identification of best practices is insufficient to cause a meaningful change
in the profession’s standards of care. What is required is a shared
set of understandings and practices among the members of the
profession itself. Legal education provides the greatest possible
mechanism for bringing about a widespread change in professional behavior.
Rigorous teaching about negotiation and other forms of settlement is a relatively recent phenomenon. As recently as two
generations ago, only a handful of law schools had any courses on
the topic.236 Today, many law schools in the United States offer
courses on negotiation, mediation, and other nonlitigation dispute resolution mechanisms.237 The ABA has, for several decades,
had a Section specifically dedicated to Dispute Resolution. Its
membership now exceeds five thousand practitioners, roughly the
same size as the ABA’s sections on Intellectual Property, on Criminal Justice, or on International Law, for example.238 There are
multiple specialized law journals devoted to the topic,239 and some
law schools offer advanced degrees focusing on negotiation or dispute resolution.240 A review of the syllabi of law school courses
suggests a remarkable consistency in the negotiation concepts being taught to aspiring lawyers.241 It may have been remarkable at
one point that law students were learning to “focus on interests,

236 See Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of
ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 Ohio St J Disp
Resol 25, 31 (2010).
237 ABA Directory (ABA and University of Oregon School of Law), archived at
http://perma.cc/B7PP-8SZW.
238 Compare Section of Dispute Resolution (ABA), archived at http://perma.cc/4EK2
-YGZL (stating that there are 10,000 members), with Section of Family Law (ABA), archived at http://perma.cc/GML2-UHLD (stating that there are 12,000 members), and
Health Law Section (ABA), archived at http://perma.cc/7QPH-4PWF (stating that there
are 10,600 members).
239 See, for example, The Harvard Negotiation Law Review; The Ohio State Journal
on Dispute Resolution; Journal of Dispute Resolution (University of Missouri School of
Law); Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal; Willamette Journal of International
Law and Dispute Resolution; Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution.
240 See, for example, Dispute Resolution (Certificate) (University of Missouri School of
Law 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/BMS5-UMTU; Dispute Resolution Certificate Program (Pepperdine Law 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/G2WB-3S9F; Concentrations:
Dispute Resolution (Oregon School of Law), archived at http://perma.cc/Z3NQ-HXJG.
241 See Dispute Resolution Syllabi (The University of Missouri, 2019), archived at
http://perma.cc/845D-2U8W (collecting syllabi from a wide variety dispute resolution
courses).
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not positions,” or to focus on understanding and improving a client’s BATNA, for example. A review of several dozen published
syllabi and of available casebooks reveals not one example of a
law school negotiation course in which these concepts are not
taught.242 It is true that negotiation remains an elective—if perpetually oversubscribed—course at most law schools. Still, given
the prevalence and consistency of these negotiation lessons,
might these (and other) concepts become so familiar, so understood, so adopted as to cause a shift in what constitutes “ordinary
care” in the practice of law?
E.

What if De Facto Immunity Were Not the Norm?

What policy consequences would follow if the landscape were
to shift in a way that caused a change to the de facto immunity
lawyers presently enjoy? Concerns tend to fall into three categories: (1) that any reform would drive up the cost of legal services
without corresponding benefit, (2) that any reform would dampen
the likelihood of settlement, and (3) that reforms would achieve
neither appropriate deterrence nor compensation. I acknowledge
and address each, briefly, in turn.
Any move toward greater accountability, in any form, creates
the real risk that transaction costs will increase. This is true of
training requirements, of practice standards, of record keeping,
and of virtually anything else that aims to change existing behaviors in any professional context. If more lawyers were exposed to
the prospect of accountability in the form of malpractice actions,
wouldn’t that added cost simply be passed on to clients? Pointing
to medical malpractice premiums, one might reasonably have
some concern that lawyers would begin to practice defensive lawyering in a way that drives up costs without corresponding benefit
to clients. I am skeptical that the costs of complying with minimal
competence standards and documenting that compliance would,
in fact, be significant. To the extent patterns of practice change,
the costs of engaging in those behaviors goes down. And to the
extent there are uncompensated client victims, I am not sure that
it is entirely proper to frame appropriate compensation as a
“cost.” The question is whether the compensation is appropriate
and whether the costs of providing that compensation exceed

242 The only hesitation I have in making this categorical assertion is that the principal
text used in two of the available syllabi does not include the use of the acronym “BATNA.”
It does, however, urge students to consider “nonsettlement alternatives.” Charles Craver,
Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement 142 (Carolina 2016).

2019]

Settlement Malpractice

1891

some other mechanism of deterrence or compensation. Still, I
acknowledge that there would surely be some costs associated
with making the transition to a system in which the prospect of a
settlement malpractice was more than a statistical anomaly.
A second objection I have heard is that any change to lawyers’
roles in the settlement system will cause an undesirable decrease
in the rate at which cases settle. Although some question the desirability of consensual resolution as the modal means by which
cases are resolved, settlement is unarguably prominent in our
current system. I find neither logical nor empirical support, however, for the concern that an increase in lawyers’ exposure to settlement malpractice would cause lawyers to be gun-shy about recommending settlement to their clients. Logically, a lawyer saying,
“you should take this offer” is as likely to be flawed as a lawyer
saying, “you should reject this offer.” Furthermore, to the extent
misconduct is leading to inappropriate settlements (that is, settlements that would not have occurred in a world without misconduct), then as a policy matter, I cannot imagine that we would
prefer a system in which those settlements are being deterred.
The third, and in my view, most significant objection to the
prospect of expanding lawyers’ exposure to malpractice for their
settlement conduct is the risk that tort-based malpractice is the
wrong mechanism for achieving the aims of deterrence or compensation. It is certainly true that negligence-based malpractice
systems have considerable limitations. Just as the link between
medical malpractice cases and quality medical services is debatable,243 perhaps any malpractice regime will sit awkwardly in the
context of lawyering and settlement. Furthermore, as Professor
David Wilkins has suggested, tort-based liability controls in the
lawyering context are challenging because only agency problems
that result in large provable damages are likely to be brought into
the system. Moreover, litigation against lawyer-defendants is
particularly difficult to win. Lawyers are adept at covering their
tracks ex ante and fabricating self-interested reconstructions of
the facts ex post. In addition, courts tend to be deferential to the
exercise of judgment by lawyers. As a result, despite their desire
243 See, for example, Michelle M. Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 Tex L Rev 1595, 1615 (2002) (finding only “limited evidence” supporting the theory that tort liability serves as a deterrent);
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L Rev 377, 422–30 (1994) (suggesting tort liability produces, at most, a
“weak” form of deterrence); Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice Reform, 76 Md L Rev 247, 257–60 (2017) (surveying research on the mismatch between medical negligence and patient recovery in medical malpractice cases).
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for compensation, clients with small or difficult to prove claims
are unlikely to gain access to the malpractice system.244
Perhaps, therefore, we would be better off devoting policy energies toward other approaches to assuring lawyer quality in this
context. Perhaps greater education is in order, either as a prelude
to professional life, as part of continuing legal education, or as
part of the rehabilitation of lawyers who are found to have violated some professional standard.245 Perhaps government officials—either judges or regulators—will gain greater visibility into
lawyers’ actions in a way that would permit public accountability.246 Perhaps courts will expand their treatment of such matters
through the lens of equity, rather than that of malpractice.247 Still,
even if these other avenues are worthwhile, it is inconceivable
that a critical part of professional practice (in this case settlement
lawyering) should be functionally excluded from the profession’s
foundational system of private accountability.
CONCLUSION
The assumptions at the core of the current legal malpractice
system envision lawyers-as-litigators. Even if those assumptions
are appropriate for addressing instances of litigation malpractice,
their fit with the broader realities of modern practice is awkward.
Two facts, juxtaposed, serve to illustrate this dynamic.
244 Wilkins, 105 Harv L Rev at 831 (cited in note 25). See also Goldberg, 59 Vand L
Rev at 1079 (cited in note 38) (“Perhaps state governments or the federal government
ought to put in place systems of regulation and compensation that operate apart from the
tort system, or schemes that foster conditions that will permit market forces to generate
incentives toward safety.”).
245 For a thoughtful argument that the bar ought to apply restorative justice principles
in the context of attorney discipline, see generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Liana G.T.
Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 Nev L J 253 (2012).
246 Perhaps we will see a greater role for judicial colloquies in the civil context, similar
to the role they play in the criminal context. See, for example, Julian A. Cook III, Crumbs
from the Master’s Table: The Supreme Court, Pro Se Defendants and the Federal Guilty
Plea Process, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1895, 1900 (2006); J. Vincent Aprile II, Waiving the
Integrity of the Criminal Justice System, 24 Crim Just 46, 51 (2010). See also Puder, 874
A2d at 536–38. Or perhaps judicial involvement in settlement conferences will increase in
ways that provide some measure of oversight. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and
Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L
Rev 485, 506–07 (1985); Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles
in Settlement, 78 Ohio St L J 73, 73, 105 (2017) (proposing structural limitations on judges
serving dual-neutral roles of “managing a settlement process” and “serving as a settlement
neutral”). Each of these would, of course, be complicated.
247 See, for example, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, From Riggs v.
Palmer to Shelley v. Kraemer: The Continuing Significance of the Law-Equity Distinction
*7–9 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper, Nov 7, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/R5WF-EYN6.
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First, the vast majority of all civil lawsuits are resolved
through negotiated settlements.248 Second, fewer than 1 percent of
reported legal malpractice cases and only about 1.5 percent of bar
complaints relate to lawyers’ roles in settlement—and even in those
instances when clients do complain, lawyers usually prevail.249
I make no empirical claim that lawyers are atypically awful
at those aspects of their services that relate to settlement when
compared with all other aspects of lawyering. But I see no reason
to assume that lawyers are atypically flawless with respect to settlement negotiation and counseling. Instead, I assume that some
lawyers sometimes provide substandard advice or other services
to their clients in the context of settlement, and I argue that the
current malpractice system does a poor job of addressing the modern reality of lawyer-as-settlor.
Malpractice regimes do not, of course, represent the only way
to seek to protect clients or to ensure the quality of lawyers’ services. Education, professional norms, ethical standards, heightened governmental scrutiny, and reputational markets also commonly play important roles. But I can envision no overall system
of effective professional quality assurance that provides the kind
of blanket de facto immunity we see lawyers enjoying with respect
to this increasingly critical aspect of their professional service.
Instead, the realities of modern lawyering, in which the lawyeras-settlor role is more prominent, demand that lawyers be held to
a different set of standards than those created solely with litigation in mind. The advice lawyers provide to their clients about the
prospect of settlement does not deserve the sweeping judgmental
deference of lawyers’ litigation decisions. The case-within-a-case
method of judging the impacts of lawyers’ alleged misconduct
must adapt, in the settlement context, to the realities of non-zerosum settlement and probabilistic assessments. Clients’ ability to
exercise autonomy—the ability to choose between settlement and
continued litigation—should be recognized in practice, not just in
the theoretical or aspirational standards of the profession. And
we have to be open to the prospect that a lawyer may make a decision in an across-the-table negotiation that is so substandard as
to constitute a breach of her professional duty to provide her client with at least ordinary care.
Honest conversation about all of this is critical to the sustained
viability of the profession. We should acknowledge the prospect of

248
249

Moffitt, 80 Ind L Rev at 728 (cited in note 10).
See Part I.
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settlement malpractice, seeking to compensate those who are injured, and seeking to enact structural changes that decrease the
risk of such injuries in the future. Negotiated settlements are here
to stay. Lawyers will continue to play important roles in those
settlements. Clients should be justified in believing not only that
their lawyers are improving at this aspect of their practice but
also that their lawyers are accountable when they fall short.
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APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A.

Reported Malpractice Cases
Online Database. After verifying that searches in Westlaw
and Lexis produce no meaningful differences in results
from identical Boolean and other searches, I opted to use
Westlaw exclusively.
Date restrictions. I restricted the search to reported opinions
between 2008 and 2017. The data, therefore, include some
complaints filed before 2008 and surely excludes some
complaints filed in 2017. Ten years represents long
enough to produce a sizeable dataset, and I am aware of
no intervening changes in law or circumstance that would
suggest that I would have seen different results if I had
searched 2007 or 2018.
Jurisdictional restrictions. Although most claims against
lawyers are based on state law (tort or contract),
complaints against lawyers can arise in either state or
federal court. For reasons of research bandwidth, I
selected eleven states, rather than conducting a fiftystate survey. The selected states reflect a cross section in
terms of (1) region, (2) population, and (3) relevant legal
malpractice doctrines, whether stemming from tort or
contract-based theories of liability. I excluded states that
appear to have relatively idiosyncratic jurisprudence on
specific aspects of legal malpractice relevant to
settlement malpractice.250
Database filters. Both Westlaw and Lexis provide prefiltered
subdatabases for users wanting to restrict their searches.
Westlaw, for example, permits one to restrict searches to
include only cases with West Key Number 45 (“Attorney
and Client”), and within this, a subcategory of keys
related to the “duties and liabilities of attorney to client.”
Lexis permits searches to be restricted to their

250 For example, I chose not to study Pennsylvania, because the Muhammad rule precludes a number of malpractice actions that would not be barred in other jurisdictions. In
this way, the data may slightly overstate the frequency with which settlement malpractice
claims arise as a nationwide matter. See generally Muhammad, 587 A2d 1346. See also
Part II.B.
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preconstructed “Legal Ethics” database. Neither of these
perfectly restricts the dataset to legal malpractice claims,
however. These databases include many cases that do not
involve an allegation of legal malpractice, as such. For
example, these subsets of cases include actions alleging
the unauthorized practice of law, as well as disputes
about whether state agencies may compel attorneys to
provide their social security numbers and whether the
attorney or the client must pay for copying costs of
materials in a client file following termination.251 These
filters also fail to include many legal malpractice actions
simply because the issues involved in the particular
judicial opinion in question fall outside of their predefined
boundaries.252
Search Terms: Legal Malpractice. Because no existing
database fully captures only reported cases about legal
malpractice and instead create a risk of under- and
overinclusion, and after consulting with research
professionals at both Westlaw and Lexis for their
guidance,253 I constructed the following Boolean search to
use in the full dataset:
(LEGAL LAWYER ATTORNEY) /5 (MALPRACTICE MISBEHAV!
OFFEN! VIOLAT!)
The results of these searches appear summarized in
Table 1 as “Total Reported Legal Malpractice Cases.”
Search Terms: Settlement Malpractice. Within the broader
subset of cases identified as legal malpractice actions, I
then sought to isolate those involving alleged settlement
malpractice. After conducting a substantive review of
several hundred cases from multiple jurisdictions, I
concluded that the following Boolean search terms would
251 See, for example, McVeigh v Fleming, 410 SW3d 287, 288 (Mo App 2013) (dispute
regarding whether a client must contribute to his attorney’s photocopying costs); Tankersley
v Almand, 73 F Supp 3d 629, 631–33 (D Md 2014) (considering whether a lawyer was
required to provide his social security number to keep his license).
252 See generally, for example, Quinn v Fishkin, 117 F Supp 3d 134 (D Conn 2015);
Beaudry v Harding, 104 A3d 134 (Me 2014).
253 Representatives from both Westlaw and Lexis suggested almost identical Boolean
search terms. See Online Interview with LexisNexis Support Representative (July 18, 2018)
(on file with author). See also Online Interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney (July 17,
2018) (on file with author).
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(SETTL! NEGOT! OFFER COMPROMIS! RESOL!)
This search produces a smaller dataset of cases, reported
in Table 1 as “‘Hits’ Using Search Terms.” Although I am
confident that this filter identifies virtually all cases
involving settlement malpractice, many of the “Hits” were
actually false positives, in the sense that the underlying
cases involved allegations of legal malpractice, but the
alleged malpractice had nothing to do with settlement
malpractice. Some of the false positives were predictable
at the outset. For example, SETTL! and NEGOT! captured a
large number of cases related to complaints about the
results of plea bargains in the criminal context.
Furthermore, there were a number of civil cases in which
settlement negotiations were discussed but were not
actually the basis of the legal malpractice claim. For
example, I read a disturbing number of cases in which
attorneys were alleged to have stolen funds from their
clients. In many of those cases, the stolen funds were the
proceeds of settlements. The alleged impropriety in those
cases, however, involved the theft of the money, and there
was nothing remarkable about the fact that those funds
came from a settlement, rather than a court judgment or
from an escrow account, for example.
A sizeable number of false positives also came from the
fact that the terms in the search are commonly used in
cases not about settlement malpractice—something that
could only be sorted out manually on a case-by-case
review. SETTL!, for example, yielded a number of court
opinions informing readers that something is well settled
under the law.254 NEGOT! described a wide range of
different nonsettlement negotiations.255 OFFER produced
cases in which courts ruled against plaintiffs for
“offer[ing] no argument challenging the court’s

254 See, for example, Kaye v Wilson-Gaskins, 135 A3d 892, 903 (Md App 2016); Spitz
v St. Luke’s Medical Center, 2007 WL 926391 *2 (Ohio App); Wiegand v Wiegand, 21 A3d
489, 491 (Conn App 2011); Bridge v Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co, 553 US 639, 650 (2008).
255 See, for example, Oliver v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 920 NE2d 203,
215 (Ohio Com Pl 2009) (negotiating sports contracts for college athletes).
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conclusion”256 or for being “unable to offer sufficient expert
testimony.”257 COMPROMIS! sometimes referred to a party
having “compromised his duties,”258 “compromising any
confidential information,”259 or even the prospect that
sexual relations with a client might “compromise[ ] the
client’s legal interests.”260 The RESOL! search produced a
case, for example, in which a court provided an
explanation about the timeframes during which posttraumatic stress disorder is expected normally to
“resolve” through therapy.261
B.

Disciplinary Cases
Date and Jurisdictional restrictions. As with the civil
malpractice search described in the previous Section, I
restricted the survey to opinions appearing between 2008
and 2017. I also restricted the research to ten states,
aiming for a cross section in terms of (1) region,
(2) population, and (3) availability of data. For reasons I
describe below, the third of these criteria was particularly
important because of the challenges associated with the
manner in which many states publish their disciplinary
opinions.
Limitation: No Comprehensive, Searchable Databases. From
a research perspective, the most significant challenge in
studying disciplinary actions with a focus like this is that
no comprehensive dataset exists that would permit the
kinds of searches I used with civil malpractice actions.262
Many states publish rolled-up data, for example by
providing an overview of the magnitude of disciplinary
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Gray v Weinstein, 955 A2d 1246, 1253 (Conn App 2008).
Barrow v Walsh, 2011 WL 4716283, *3 (Conn Super).
258 Disciplinary Counsel v Schmidt, 983 NE2d 1310, 1313 (Ohio 2012).
259 Joyce v Rough, 2008 WL 4763485, *1 (Ohio App).
260 Stender v Blessum, 897 NW2d 491, 507 (Iowa 2017), quoting Kling v Landry, 686
NE2d 33, 40 (Ill App 1997). See also Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich
LPA, 559 US 573, 612 (2010) (“[T]he Court, by failing to adopt a reasonable interpretation
to counter these excesses, risks compromising its own institutional responsibility to ensure
a workable and just litigation system.”).
261 In re Application of Bell, 861 NE2d 533, 534 (Ohio 2007).
262 Wisconsin is the only state with an online database of disciplinary opinions formatted in a way that permits substantive Boolean searches with date restrictors. It did
not, however, permit a global search about the total number of cases, so I omitted it from
my list.
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complaint activity as part of an annual report.263 They
may even break those complaints into preexisting
categories, but none of them aligned with this Article’s
research.264 To the extent searchable databases of
disciplinary opinions exist, almost all of them are
designed to permit clients or prospective clients to
research particular lawyers, rather than to search topics
or terms across multiple cases or years.265 I therefore had
to construct datasets for each of the states I wished to
study. This involved downloading every opinion from
every year for each of the selected states. Most states
provided these opinions only in a scanned PDF format,
requiring individual processing using software to create a
searchable document out of each opinion. The result is a
unique database of searchable disciplinary opinions
requiring several gigabytes of storage for the files.
Search Terms: Settlement Malpractice. I employed the same
Boolean search protocols with the dataset of disciplinary
opinions as with civil malpractice actions:
(SETTL! NEGOT! OFFER COMPROMIS! RESOL!)
As with the earlier search, this produced a number of
false positives, for many of the same reasons. As with the
civil malpractice search, I found no reliable method for
automating the remainder of this search. An individual
review of more than one thousand disciplinary opinions
identified comparatively fewer false positives in this
dataset, probably because, unlike in the Westlaw search,
all of these cases necessarily involved an allegation of
263 See, for example, 2017 Joint Annual Report: State of Michigan Attorney Grievance
Commission Annual Report (State of Michigan Attorney Discipline Board and Attorney
Grievance Commission, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/FE77-43ZN; Lawyer Discipline
Statistics (Florida Bar, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8GXY-9Y4E.
264 See, for example, Lawyer Discipline Statistics (Florida Bar, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/8GXY-9Y4E (breaking down complaints by type of reprimand). See also
Index to Ethics Opinions (North Carolina State Bar), archived at http://perma.cc/B9LZ
-MNU5 (categorizing by practice area).
265 The ABA curates the National Lawyer Disciplinary Data Bank, but it permits only
searches for particular lawyers, not for particular disciplinary actions across the population of lawyers. Its use is principally for “disciplinary authorities and bar admissions agencies in providing a central repository of information to facilitate reciprocal discipline and
to help prevent the admission of lawyers who have been disbarred or suspended elsewhere.” National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank (ABA, Sept 10, 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/686Q-MBAY.
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attorney misconduct of some sort. The only remaining
filtering question, therefore, was whether the misconduct
was related to settlement.

